


DUKE
UNIVERSITY



LIBRARY



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2020 with funding from
Duke University Libraries

GENERAL
Chiang Kai-shek

This book was published in China under the title *Sian: A Coup d'État*.



Acme—P. & A. Photo

Mayling Soong. A photograph taken while she was a student at Wellesley College, 1914–1917, before she became Mme Chiang Kai-shek.

GENERAL
Chiang Kai-shek

THE ACCOUNT OF THE FORTNIGHT IN SIAN
WHEN THE FATE OF CHINA HUNG
IN THE BALANCE

BY

General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek



ILLUSTRATED

Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc.

GARDEN CITY 1937 NEW YORK

PRINTED AT THE *Country Life Press*, GARDEN CITY, N. Y., U. S. A.

COPYRIGHT, 1937

BY DOUBLEDAY, DORAN & COMPANY, INC.

COPYRIGHT, 1937, BY MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

751
C5526

FOREWORD

FOR THE SHEER THRILL of danger, romance, calm courage and dramatic climax, these two documents have all the fascinating interest of a historical novel. But this is immensely intensified when it is realized that they are the authoritative records of actual happenings only a few months ago while the fate of a great nation was literally trembling in the balance and the whole world was awaiting the outcome with puzzled bewilderment and anxious forebodings. Mme Chiang describes her part in this sensational occurrence while the incidents are still fresh in her memory and in doing so unconsciously reveals a wifely devotion, a woman's intuitive understanding of the basic issues and a superb heroism which are the more convincing because written with so objective a purpose to give the simple facts.

General Chiang has kept a diary for many years,

recording events and his own reactions with a soldier's bluntness and the artless honesty of writing what was intended only for personal use. This habit served him in good stead when earlier sections were surreptitiously read by his captors and now when he is determined to share this part with a public which he feels is entitled to first-hand information.

Both narratives have the stamp of elemental sincerity in their frank disclosure of thought and feeling which would be made only out of deep conviction of the service thus rendered.

But the real significance of these documents lies in the evidence they furnish of a genuine transformation in Chinese political life. The mutual affection of husband and wife is sublimated into absorbing concern over the people's welfare. Family ties are strengthened by this common bond. Captors, visitors and the grimly taciturn captive argue together from this standpoint in language made realistic because they are all facing easily possible death and the leading figure had already passed beyond its fear. In his own consciousness he had made the supreme sacrifice rather than be unfaithful to his country's trust. Such loyalty and heroism have been by no means lacking in Chinese history, but never before perhaps with the common people of the country so poignantly in mind nor—chiefly for their sakes—with so consistent a determination to avoid the horrors of civil strife. And

the people have worthily responded. The teaching of their ancient sages and their whole cultural heritage have trained them to an extent true of no other country for recognizing the claims of moral leadership in their rulers. General Chiang Kai-shek had already won an increasing support throughout the country because of his unselfish and untiring devotion to their welfare. He could easily have exploited his high office for his own aggrandizement or for winning cheap popularity as their defender against foreign aggression. His policies have caused much real misunderstanding—largely because so different from what would naturally be expected.

The Sian episode brought out with vivid force the spontaneous admiration of the whole vast population for a leader whom they feel to be theirs by their own choice, independent of his official status. This is of the very essence of democracy even before its formal structure has been completed in China. General Chiang is great in the simple reality of his moral purpose and more powerful than any dictator because his people are aware of this. These transcripts from his inner experience and that of a wife who is in every sense his comrade serve to confirm the people's judgment.

Even apart from the heartening proof of unity and patriotic purpose pulsating now through Chinese officialdom and populace, there are suggestions of wider value in these records. So far from

being inscrutably subtle, as Western people are accustomed to think of Chinese behavior, was not the settlement of the Sian incident an instance of sanity and of reliance on reason and right rather than on force, the efficiency of which has been demonstrated by the results? Its strangeness, if any, is in the quietly unaffected way in which the protagonists lived up to the highest ideals which all men revere, and bravely submitted these to the pragmatic test with a selfless abandon which could only spring from their belief in the supremacy of spiritual realities.

J. LEIGHTON STUART

*Yenching University,
Peiping, China.
March 17, 1937.*

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD. By Dr J. Leighton Stuart . . .	v
WHAT CHINA HAS FACED. By Mme Chiang Kai-shek	1
SIAN: A COUP D'ÉTAT. By Mme Chiang Kai-shek	63
A FORTNIGHT IN SIAN: EXTRACTS FROM A DIARY. By Chiang Kai-shek	118
THE GENERALISSIMO'S ADMONITION TO CHANG HSUEH-LIANG AND YANG HUCHEN PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM SIAN	177
NAMES OF CHINESE PERSONS AND PLACES MENTIONED IN THE STORY AND DIARY .	185

ILLUSTRATIONS

Mayling Soong, before she became Mme Chiang Kai-shek	<i>Frontispiece</i>
--	---------------------

FACING PAGE

General Chiang Kai-shek and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang	48
Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, Panchan Lama and General Chiang Kai-shek in 1931	112
General Chang Hsueh-liang, Mme Chiang Kai-shek, General Chiang Kai-shek and General Yen Shi-shan in 1937	160

GENERAL
Chiang Kai-shek

WHAT CHINA HAS FACED

By Mayling Soong Chiang

(MME CHIANG KAI-SHEK)

WHEN any Occidental wishes to arrive at a correct and realistic estimate of China and her problems as they exist today, with the object of comparing them with the conditions that obtain in occidental countries throughout the world, one important thing is essential: he must, if he is to be intellectually honest, keep resolutely in mind the fact that before any existing occidental nation was born China was venerable with age and was hidebound with restrictive forms of conduct and customs, which, despite the high culture which had existed for centuries, rigidly enveloped her until a short two decades ago, when the revolution which overthrew the Manchu dynasty brought the first breath of emancipation.

A hundred years or so before that time organization characterized the occidental world. By the time (1911) when China emerged from thralldom the

world had, according to the lights of the individual countries, the most effective forms of government. Age-old China was just opening her eyes, as it were. New countries like the United States, Canada and Australia had passed through their painful processes of pioneering and had nothing more to do than develop new resources in accordance with new processes and scientific inventions. They had been able to build their nations on virgin ground. They had practically no one to oppose their utilization of new methods and devices. They could march unrestrainedly with the fast-moving advance of science and knowledge; they could follow their own desires in employing this nostrum or that panacea or any invention to aid their national development.

But China was a vast country with a dense population hoary with ancient ideas, suspicious, superstitious, conservative and aloof. The main aim of the Chinese was to be left alone, to avoid change. They resented new methods, new inventions and new people. They wore queues, and they despised and disliked the short-haired "barbarians." They fought to sustain their belief in their superstitions, in their fortunetellers and in their geomancers, which belief they considered to be an essential part of their culture. The chief obstacles to progress were, and in sections still are, "fengshui" (the spirits of wind and water), "face", and "mei-yu-fa-tze" (impossible). If the word "impossible" was not in Napo-

leon's dictionary, it was, figuratively, on every sheet of the old Chinese lexicon.

Thus the revolution confronted the leaders with the problem of overcoming dense and apparently desired ignorance before they could succeed in introducing even the most ordinary modern aids to life. Whereas in new countries like America, Canada and Australia the founders were able to do straightforward pioneer work in the building up of a new land, the leaders in China had to grapple, and are still grappling, with the tremendous task of transforming an ancient civilization, with its strange customs and ideas, into a modern state. Putting new wine into old bottles is not always an easy, enviable or wise task. On the fringe of China, that is, in the coastal ports, where there has been impact with foreigners and foreign methods for a long number of years, it is comparatively easy to make effective use of new ideas. But in interior China, where there is a population of over four hundred million people, one has to begin with quite fundamental education to develop the popular mind to a receptive state so that up-to-date methods can be applied.

Processes of education that are not at all necessary in occidental countries are rendered essential in China before fundamental changes can effectively be introduced, because conditions are vitally different from those that obtain in the old countries of Europe or the new ones of the North American

continent. In European countries the populations are, comparatively, not large, and the percentage of illiteracy is small; in China the population is enormous, and the percentage of illiteracy was, until a decade or so ago, correspondingly great. Now education is rapidly spreading even to the remotest centres.

In new occidental countries, such as Canada, nations have been carved out of the primeval in the memory of living man. In China there was civilization, with high culture, centuries prior to Babylon's rise and fall. That was long before occidental emergence from the woad-stain era and ages before the laying of the foundations of those social and political systems which have enabled the Occidentals to develop spiritually, scientifically and materially, and achieve world leadership. While the Occident vigorously expanded by forcing a resolute way through the barriers of ignorance, superstition and crudity which marked the Dark Ages, the Chinese race, content in the splendor of its culture, wished nothing better than to believe that it stood supreme and that any other peoples—the "outer barbarians"—were of little or no consequence and were, at best, mere tribute payers to the exalted emperors of China.

China not only felt, but actually was, self-contained. Really she needed nothing from the outside world and was quite prepared to remain shut

up within the confines of her own borders, asking nothing and wanting nothing. She not only had a written and spoken language, but she had developed art of high quality; the navigator's compass was invented in China, also silk culture, gunpowder, paper, printing and numerous other things whose enhanced counterpart has been found through the inventive genius of the moderns. The Chinese were able to grow what they needed for sustenance; they were indifferent to many things that they are now securing as luxuries, and in the vast territory they occupied they became producers and sellers of all their necessities, to say nothing of their artistic products and achievements. They knew how to clothe themselves and how to live. But there was profound ignorance of many things upon which the success of the modern world is based.

They were, however, adept in some sciences. Records show that they were conversant with astronomy and meteorology ages ago. Their pharmacopoeia contained medicines for the majority of ailments. Indeed, many of them are now being used in modern medical practice. The one that people are now most familiar with is "ephedrine."¹ That is of Chinese ori-

¹Ephedrine is obtained from the herb *ma huang* which grows prolifically in west China. It was used for asthmatic complaints in China as long ago as five thousand years, the Emperor Shen-Nung, who is regarded as the author of a book describing hundreds of drugs obtained from herbs, known as the *Pentso*, being credited with its discovery. It was only about 1924, I think, that its real importance for the treatment of respiratory complaints was discovered by foreign drug manufacturers.

gin and is derived from plants which grow in China. The extraction of all manner of oils is an ancient trade. Wood oil, that figures so largely in paint manufacture in foreign countries, is a product of China, as also is the marvellous soya bean. There are innumerable other things which come from China as a distinct contribution to the rest of the world.

But in this comparatively isolated life led by our forefathers superstition, strange notions and queer customs developed. Mining was frowned upon because it was believed that a hole dug deep into the ground would release angry dragons, or spirits of the earth, who would spread pestilence broadcast. When the first railway appeared in China it was swiftly torn up and had to be transported elsewhere. It would disturb the spirits. Later on when other railways came the ignorant people were so afraid of them that they did everything they could to prevent their construction. In America and Canada, for instance, railways could be built, but there was no population; in China there was the population, but the railways could not be built until recent years because of it. But progress was insistent, and since the people could not continuously prevent the building of railways they did the next best thing: they kept them as far away as possible from their old walled cities. They were afraid of supernatural manifestations in those days, and the present gen-

eration has come to regret that their grandfathers and fathers were so foolish, since quite a distance has now to be travelled in some cases to get to the railway stations. As time went on the belief that railways and telegraph lines would exert bad influences upon the spirits was broken down by necessity. Now the Chinese people appreciate the value not only of railways, but of any other form of modern transportation. The change was effected, however, only by persistence in education as well as by experience.

It is not many years ago that no highways existed in China. In fact when the republic came there was no car and no highway a car could run on. Travel in the southern and central parts of the country was mostly on canals or by sedan chair; in the northern part on wheelbarrows, by sedan chair, by mule litters or carts. When the motorcar first appeared it was to the ignorant people nothing but a death-dealing fiery dragon that would menace the tranquillity, if not the existence, of all who came within range of its noise and clatter. The construction of highways was resisted just as the railway was resisted. Now highways are running throughout the length and breadth of China. The people who feared the fiery dragon now crowd the buses and use motorcars as though they have been familiar with them not only during their lives, but throughout their history.

I mention all this merely to indicate the difficulties that confronted those who endeavoured to make available to China the useful among modern inventions. To break down superstition millions of people had to be educated to the use of new things. Sometimes it took half a century, sometimes less, but always there was opposition. This is a universal truth. For example, when the steam engine was invented in the Occident the people rose against it because they deemed it a menace to their livelihood and to the use of the horse; a boat could not be made of iron because it was demonstrated that a piece of iron would sink immediately it was put in water.

We in China have had, and still have, similar problems, but on a vaster scale. In addition, as I have mentioned, there was the almost universal ignorance of the people. In the very old days they knew nothing about outside affairs. Anything they learned came to them for ages through the storytellers. Even the education of the highest was confined to the memorizing of the old Chinese classics and to the writing of literary essays. Practical education was not even thought of. Vocational training was not only not heard of but would have been regarded with scorn if anyone had suggested it. Gentlemen did not soil their hands in old China. Trade was lowly. The artisan and the workman existed, of course, doing their jobs crudely or with

great artistry as the case may be, but they had no standing. Those modern inventions which permitted the Occident to march so rapidly were looked askance at by the Chinese people, even when some of them did manage to enter the country. Indeed it is not so many decades ago since the first pretence of a newspaper appeared, and then only the literati could understand it.

Corresponding with the slowness of development of practical devices which so greatly ameliorate the lot of occidental people in their daily lives, political development was restricted. The monarchs of old administered China with great success according to their ideas, but their ideas of success will not fit in with modern notions of political advancement. China was controlled by an official class, selected as a result of literary examination. Candidates did not necessarily have to possess any executive ability or administrative capacity, but many developed it.

Well or badly governed, the people were not permitted to criticize the government, particularly during the reign of the Manchus. While the people were expected by the tax collectors to open their purses, they were obliged to shut their mouths on their grievances and make demand neither for service nor for the right to express a voice in the government of the nation. This system could have but one tendency—to cause the people to forget entirely affairs of state and confine themselves to matters

making for the betterment of their own lot. The family and the clan became the most important factors in Chinese life. Indeed the growth of this system was such that China could, until comparatively recently, carry on without a central government except to take care of foreign affairs. There was a time, not so many years ago—after the establishment of the republic—when China was without a president, a premier or parliament for several weeks. But everything proceeded as if nothing had happened, solely because the people went about their business without question, looking always to the heads of their clans in family affairs and to their elders in affairs of their towns and villages. The occasional flights of early “presidents” of China from Peking, caused by political eruptions, did not even interest the people and only concerned them if troops were brought into action. The imposition of modern political notions upon them affected them much as an irritant would, since it looked to them like another burden which did not benefit them and which, in fact, they could very well do without.

The reign of the Manchus saw the comparative stagnation of China. But the latter part of the reign also saw the development of new thoughts as a result of the increasing impact with other nations, although the masses in the interior knew nothing of any new mode or thought of life. All the people

asked was to be left alone to eke out an existence. They paid their taxes to the tax gatherers, and they asked nothing in return—not even a pathway or anything now regarded as rightful service to the people for the contribution made by them to state revenues.

Because they knew nothing of administrative affairs they took no interest in them. They were taught that if they did take too much of an interest their liberty would be in jeopardy, if not their lives. So when the movement started to try and secure for China a government elected by the popular will, years and years of ceaseless energetic effort had to be made to awaken sections of the population to an understanding of exactly what their rights and privileges were. Patriotism had apparently died a natural death.

The revolution that overthrew the Manchus was started by the late Dr Sun Yat-sen. He endured years of danger before the time came when he could safely rest his feet in his own country. But the time did come when he and his followers were able to awaken articulate sections of the public to a realization of their benighted state as well as to an understanding of their own legitimate rights as citizens. Many efforts which were made during a number of years failed to overthrow the Manchu dynasty, but at last success came, and what is known as the Republic of China was inaugurated.

The general lack of education and the particular lack of experience previously mentioned saw the republic born in China with few competent to tend the nurseling. The old official class resented the sudden overthrow of its prerogatives involved in so radical a change of control, and though it could not succeed in defeating the republic it contrived to obstruct and delay for some time the introduction of many new methods based on modern principles. At this period much was expected of the men of new learning—the student returned from America and elsewhere—but they could do little. Curiously their mental equipment was not fitted for the task confronting them, except in a few outstanding instances. In any case they were cordially disliked by old-time officialdom, who resisted appointing them to responsible positions or frustrated their efforts to impose on China the Western ideas they had accumulated abroad, because they saw how those ideas, if adopted, would deprive them of opportunities for enrichment, if not end for them their official existences. The returned students were, however, wrong in their approach. In many cases they tried to have foreign methods adopted at once, when they should have endeavoured gradually to adapt to Chinese requirements whatever they considered to be advantageous. Tears and broken hearts were almost the order of the day in that formative period, and soon the stream of returned students, equally

burdened with high degrees and broken hopes, drifted from expected spheres of technical usefulness into spheres of political or commercial adventure or into the humble ranks of teachers of the young idea. This collapse of lofty hopes was tragic both for the men and for the country, and when I reflect upon the causes I wonder where most of the blame should be placed. Was it with the old-time official who resisted innovations or advanced ideas from a sense of self-defence? Or was it with the American universities? Did they make it too easy for the eager aspirant to secure his degree? Was he turned out with uncurbed impulses and with too much conceit of himself? I have heard it said that some universities gave some students degrees to get rid of them. That is probably a libel—and maybe it is mere persiflage. But I am certain too many of the early returned students came home without any experience and sadly lacking in mental discipline. They had not been taught to think. In other ways they came poorly equipped to find their places in the new republic. Perhaps too many of them had gone abroad at too early an age and without the steadying influence of a thorough knowledge and understanding of ancient Chinese culture. Certain it is that when they came from organized America to their own land, torn by revolution, they were ill prepared to tackle the workaday problems that confronted them. Even yet that situation exists.

Recently—and this may be cited as a typical case—a student who acquired a Ph.D. at an American university for some highly technical branch of agricultural science was content to sign up for teaching English when he returned to China, without thinking of trying to apply his special knowledge for the improvement of agriculture. My observations are that the returned students, as a rule, are not willing to suffer or to endure hardships. Their sense of responsibility and patriotism seems to have been atrophied by their years in lands of mechanical “gadgets” and labor-saving devices. Consequently they prefer the fleshpots of the coastal cities to laboring in the interior where the movie, the night club and the soda fountain do not exist. They loathe being thrown upon their own resources for amusements or pastimes. Is it that their colleges have neglected character building, since great numbers of them seem to find little or nothing within themselves in the way of reserves to draw upon? This, I believe, is the greatest defect, and next to it is their abhorrence to rolling up their sleeves and to abandoning their “white collar” attitude towards anything savoring of manual exertion. On the other hand we have students from Chinese colleges joining with enthusiasm in the hard labor entailed in the rural rehabilitation work which we launched some time ago. They are making noteworthy contributions in the application of their technical knowledge to the

accompaniment of irrepressible high spirits and initiative.

This aspect of the results of foreign education of the Chinese student is one thing, but the initial failure of the competent returned students to prove themselves must be ascribed to some extent to lack of opportunity. The old officials did not want them or their new ideas at any price.

As time went on, however, numerous returned students secured a chance to apply their knowledge. They succeeded in making their marks on their country and reflecting great credit on their universities at the same time. But even yet the task of straightening out the complexities caused by the round pegs being rooted in the square holes has to be settled; and, more than that, the newcomers who are square pegs have to be prevented from getting into the round holes and being content to stay there.

The early inability of the returned student to fit into the scheme of things, plus the determination of the resentful officials to resist and put off the evil day of dismissal as long as possible, developed complications and confusions that were baffling, and intrigues, plots and conspiracies were the order of the day. As a consequence the country became torn by internecine struggles, called civil wars, but which were not, as we know them, civil wars in which the people fought for a cause. In China, the people, as a people, really did not fight at all; were not,

until after 1928, interested in the reasons for what did pass as fighting and were merely regarded by the leaders of the factions who were struggling against one another as providential sources of money and food. The armies engaged in these so-called civil wars were armies accumulated mostly from the ranks of the hungry by unscrupulous militarists and were used to support those militarists in securing larger areas of territory to bleed. In fact a kind of feudal system developed which has only been broken down in recent years.

The progressive elements in China had to struggle continuously against all kinds of obstructions. Reforms in organized countries could go ahead, in comparison, like well-oiled machinery. In new occidental countries the pioneers could quietly carve their state out of the wilderness and become prosperous. In China reformers were anathema. One of the chief reasons why the Occident cannot understand the Chinese backwardness in adopting reforms and putting through schemes for reorganization on modern lines is because casual foreign critics, who are able to harangue from the house-tops, are ignorant of, or they forget or wilfully disregard, the background in China, and wrongly endeavour to measure China by their own standards. This has been the main stumbling block to Occidental understanding of this great country. Had the Occidental even casually studied the ancient and

modern histories of China he would have formed quite a different conception of the Chinese people and would have subconsciously arrived at the proper method to secure successful intercourse with them, commercial or otherwise. When the foreigner, full of righteous wrath, descends upon an ignorant people and forthwith condemns them for their stupidity because they cannot comprehend what he is striving to do he commits a crime, to say the least, and often provokes tragedy. In any case his progress is obstructed by passive, if not active resistance, and to that fact must be ascribed the great length of time it has taken the Occidental to secure a footing in the esteem and confidence of the Chinese people.

As I have said, the Chinese people have had to be educated even by those Chinese who are trying at the present time to bring about enlightenment and new conditions in this land. If Chinese themselves have to do that, how much more necessary must it have been for the foreigner in the early days to have patience in winning the good will of what to him were possible grateful students or potential customers? Had evolution in China developed parallel with the evolution to modernity of the occidental countries, nothing would have seemed wrong with China. And it only seems wrong now because China awakened from her long slumber just about a century after other countries and because representa-

tives of those countries happen, by mere chance, to be witnesses of China's belated struggle to change. Forgetting their own travail, they are vastly impatient with China, that is all.

Many foreign people have been puzzled to know why China should have been so backward in adopting modern methods while Japan seems to have been so apt and successful in doing so. It is very simple. The Chinese people, apart from having been deliberately kept in ignorance by their rulers in the past, have had to fight for every inch of liberty that they have won. In Japan reform began from the top, under the command of the emperor. Who has not seen, in years past, Japanese travelling all over the place in foreign countries with their little notebooks ever in their hands? In Japan no foreign traveller was free from the attentions of the inquisitive searcher after knowledge and facts. The government, too, wisely employed foreign experts to teach selected students the mysteries of foreign machines and methods, and in time Japan shone in comparison with China, whose old mandarinates scorned innovation and despised the "foreign devil" and all his works. Proceeding thus, it was an easy matter to secure eventually the enlightenment of the people in Japan. But, more important, Japan is a small country when compared with China, and the masses were much more easily reached. Reforms countenanced and introduced by the rulers of a

small country are easy of achievement, but when the rulers of a large country are deliberately obstructing any effort to introduce new methods then achievement becomes a heartbreaking and difficult task, and long and vicious struggling must ensue before it is possible to accomplish anything comparable with what is enjoyed and experienced by more enlightened peoples.

The early days of the revolution were particularly marked by the political and administrative ignorance and obstruction of the officials called upon to take over the reins of administration, by the selfishness and cupidity of large numbers who saw an opportunity to use official position for personal aggrandizement and by the reluctance of old officials to abandon what they had come to believe to be their vested interests. No old official could accept the new idea that he was a servant of the people. From viceroys to *taotais* and *yamen* runners, that was a preposterous notion. The majority of the officials regarded the people as having been specially contrived for their personal enrichment by a farseeing and beneficent Providence. It took time to change that attitude of mind, and the task was made difficult because the people themselves were afraid, or felt themselves incompetent to complain against or criticize their officials.

China suffered, in fact, from the complete absence of critical articulation or public articulation of any

kind. For this reason there was no "voice of the people." Public opinion, as it exists in the West, was unknown in China. It also, like other things, had to be developed by a process of intense education. Patriotism was killed by refusal through aeons of time to allow the people to have anything to do with national affairs.

After but a century or two of such suppression is it surprising that the people could not understand why the flag should be regarded as anything more than a colored piece of decorative bunting or why they should bother or be expected to be concerned when their country was attacked? In their language such a thing was not their business, but was the special affair of the officials. Foreigners often have contemptuously stated that patriotism did not exist in China. Of course it did not, as they know and understand its ostentatious expression. But let anyone touch with bad intent the fields of the farmers, and see what would happen. "Old hands" in China have vivid recollection of the clan fights which assumed the dimension of young battles and resulted in the deaths of many. But the flag and the country were other matters, with which the man in the street had nothing to do. During the revolution farmers were observed ploughing their fields under the screaming shells being fired from Purple Mountain, Nanking. When questioned to find out whether or not they were ignorant of shell fire or were in-

different to its danger or were out-and-out courageous, they replied with a shrug of their shoulders that the fighting was not their business, that they had their fields to plough and that if others cared to make great noises and get killed it was entirely their own concern. They were not interested even to know what the fighting was about.

To combat that state of mind it was necessary to begin a campaign to educate the people to realize the symbolic meaning of the national flag, their responsibilities as citizens and their obligations to help defend their hearths and homes. In fact the public had to be educated in everything that is accepted from childhood upwards in occidental countries as the natural inalienable rights and duties of citizenship.

The Kuomintang party, which fathered the revolution, had the responsibility of preparing the people for self-government. They aimed at establishing a constitutional regime. At the outset they were far too precipitate. They gradually learned that the people were not ready for the exercise of the franchise. What has been called a period of tutelage was consequently instituted to educate the masses in self-government and constitutional responsibilities.

The first constitutional effort proved to be a fiasco. When the Manchus were overthrown Dr Sun Yat-sen was made provisional president. Yuan

Shih-kai, then the most powerful man in the northern part of China, who was in command of what was then a united military force, effected the abdication of the Manchus on the ground that he should be the first president of China. A constitution was drafted by the representatives of the Revolutionary party, and the political circumstances surrounding its preparation constrained those responsible for the drafting of it to frame its clauses with the primary object of curtailing the powers of Yuan Shih-kai as president. However Yuan Shih-kai quickly showed that he had no intention of abiding by republican principles cast on any other lines than those of his own devising. Therefore he got from America a constitutional adviser in the person of Professor Frank J. Goodnow (now president of Johns Hopkins University) to draft a constitution.

Pretending to a high sense of legality, Yuan Shih-kai wished to be properly elected as president by a parliament, and he saw to it that only certain articles dealing with the election of president and vice-president were selected from a constitution drafted at a conference sitting at the Temple of Heaven, Peking, and promulgated on October 4, 1913. He was elected president two days after this, and on November 4, 1913 he contrived the collapse of parliament. This he did by accusing the Kuomintang members of conspiracy and depriving them of their parliamentary rights and privileges. Dr C. T.

Wang, the present Chinese ambassador to Washington, was president of the Senate in those hectic days and narrowly escaped with his life, a foreign friend seeing him out of Peking in the grey dawn of the morning. As the Kuomintang (Revolutionary party) was in a decided majority in parliament, their ejection by force caused constitutional government automatically to collapse. But events, moving faster than Yuan Shih-kai even anticipated, plunged him into a scheme to ascend the Dragon Throne as emperor despite the fact that a puppet body created by him to pose as a parliament promulgated the so-called constitution, drafted by Professor Goodnow, on May 1, 1914. The dramatic story of his effort to climb the throne is too long to tell here. In fact the real inwardness of it has never yet been written, but it ended swiftly through a revolution starting against Yuan Shih-kai and the latter's death (June 6, 1916) as a consequence of physical ailments on the eve of his resignation, or "abdication", negotiations for which were being conducted by Mr W. H. Donald (who was prominent in the Sian incident last December, twenty years later) with the Revolutionary leaders at Shanghai (represented by Dr Wang Chung-hui, now minister of foreign affairs at Nanking, and Dr C. T. Wang) when Yuan Shih-kai's death intervened. His illness could not be treated by foreign doctors on account of his superstitious wife and con-

cubines (he had thirteen of them) preventing the utilization of foreign scientific methods. His end was unaccompanied by drama or drenching blood as has been chronicled by certain foreign writers. He did not commit suicide; neither was he murdered.

Another effort was made to adopt a constitution when parliament was reconvened after the death of Yuan Shih-kai, but an attempt to insert a chapter on local government proved too much for the army leaders, and they effected the dissolution of parliament. The then president, Li Yuan-hung, fled; the "boy emperor"—now Pu Yi, of so-called "Manchukuo"—was restored to the throne for twelve days, and constitutionalism was wrecked for a long time. What was then a united army quickly broke up into factions. Their struggles brought China to the verge of chaos which lasted for a sufficient number of years to make the world think that China was not only incorrigible but beyond aid.

The stage has now been reached, however, when that attitude of mind has been abandoned. It is to be hoped that a period has definitely been put to the apparently chaotic conditions which have prevailed in China for some years. A new constitution has been drafted. Last November the people were to have been introduced to it, but storm clouds appeared in the southwest of China, the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi threatening a rupture

with Nanking. The storm did not break, however, Kwangtung collapsing and Kwangsi being constrained by the magnanimous attitude of the generalissimo to come under the banner of the Central government. But it will be wise to defer the introduction of parliamentary government for a little while longer so that the people may be properly educated to understand their responsibilities as voters—and so that they may have adequate time to become properly politically minded. Previous parliaments saw much corruption because of the ignorance of the voters. They sold their votes; and vote-buying agents soon acquired an abundance of votes to be auctioned to unscrupulous candidates, and, as a result, a substantial accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. China wants no more of that.

If what has been written above can be accepted as a necessarily cursory impression in broad strokes of the outstanding factors of China's problem up to 1926, that date can be used to mark the beginning of a new era in China. It was in that year that the Northern Expedition, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, started from Canton for the north to try and put an end to the rule of those war lords who still survived the chaotic period. A number of these were still holding various regions as semi-autonomous satrapies, and the national government, which was formed at Canton when the "boy emperor" was restored to the throne for so patheti-

cally short a period, was determined to eliminate them.

Just prior to the launching of the expedition Russian advisers had been secured by the national government. Their influence was not a good one because they were working in the interests of their own country rather than those of China. But they have to be credited with teaching leaders of the Kuomintang party the art of organizing mass movements and conducting propaganda. The Russians labored fast and furiously, but with adroit quietness, to secure control of administrative reins in pursuance of their desire to further the Soviet scheme of world revolution. China seemed to them to promise great hopes of a vast country coming easily and unsuspectingly under the sway of Red influence and direction. They counted without their host.

The Northern Expedition made unexpectedly rapid and easy progress until it captured Hankow and other ports on the Yangtze River in central China. Hankow was an important key city. By the time it was captured and the national government had moved there from Canton the Russians had so clearly shown their hand that they alarmed the Chinese leaders to a realization of the jeopardy in which they and their country stood if the Russians were allowed to secure the direction of affairs they were then demanding. The end was that the Kuo-

mintang decided to evict them lock, stock and barrel. Most of them made a spectacular flight out of China across the Gobi Desert back to the confines of the Soviet. They left behind them, however, factors in China which have since been responsible for great monetary losses and the expenditure of great effort to reduce them to impotence, to say nothing of the terrible sacrifice of life and property the people were compelled to make.

Hankow, then, was virtually the cradle of what is now the national government, with its capital at present at Nanking. Its entrance into the field of international politics was spectacular and most alarming to the Occidentals who lagged far behind the march of events at that time, to say nothing of lagging hopelessly in an understanding of the new mentality so rapidly developing in China. "The good old days" (lachrymosely lamented even now) were mourned as having gone for good, while China, at the same time, was seen through a haze of pessimism heading pell-mell to the hopeless bowwows. The members of the national government did show somewhat startling zeal in pursuing their policy to gain for China equality with foreign nations and the abolition or revision of what were described as "unequal treaties." "Imperialism" was the metaphorical red rag to the figurative bull, but rabid as it apparently made the politicians and agitators of the time, the dire forebodings of foreign observers

and the forecasts of catastrophes made by forlorn Jeremiahs have been falsified instead of fulfilled. China has exceeded expectations by healing her wounds instead of bleeding to death from them, and Time has been curiously unkind to the prophets. The national government nevertheless took time to align province after province under its banner. It was, at the outset, regarded with suspicion because the conservative elements in China considered it to be a product of the radical revolutionists. Gradually it won its spurs by cleaving to a policy based on the amelioration of the lot of the people. It continued to fight the war lords. They gradually fell beneath its blows until the last of them was driven from Peking in 1928. That was Chang Tso-lin, who was assassinated by a bomb which was exploded just as his train was approaching the station at Mukden, his headquarters in Manchuria. The evidence points to persons within the ken of the Japanese as the perpetrators of that outrage.

The national government (which, it must be remembered, is under the Kuomintang party)² was

²*The Kuomintang* (National People's party)—The source of supreme authority in China is the Kuomintang party which exerts its power primarily through the national Congress. The national Congress is composed of delegates of the Kuomintang party. When it is not in session its duties are discharged by two central committees: the Central Executive Committee (usually abbreviated into C.E.C.) and the Central Supervisory Committee (usually abbreviated into C.S.C.). The Congress consists, in the first place, of members and reserve members of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory committees; delegates elected by various party headquarters, in proportion to the number of Kuomintang members in any given constituency (whether

now able to feel confident of becoming more and more firmly based at Nanking. With the fall of Peking it entered upon a new phase of its existence, the military one having ended. It found itself, however, confronted with the necessity of cleaning up a tremendous mess. In addition it had the very onerous task of winning to its side various provincial leaders in different parts of the country who seemed to be sulking and desirous of being part of a national government only if they could control it. There were serious sporadic outbreaks, but for the first time in the modern history of the country people were found siding more and more with the Central government as against the opposing militarists. So probably the battles that were fought after 1927 might reasonably come under the category of civil wars. In the end the forces of the national government prevailed. The region governed by Nanking consequently expanded until virtually the whole country came under its jurisdiction. There still remained till the autumn of 1936, however, the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi,

provincial, municipal or district), including overseas Chinese; and of nonvoting participants designated by the Central Executive Committee and the national government from the party members or senior officials of the government.

The duties of the national Congress are: (1) to adopt and approve the reports of the national government; (2) to revise the platform and the constitution of the party; (3) to formulate new policies and new programmes for the national government to meet new situations; and, (4) to elect members of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory committees. The Congress meets every two years. To exercise the political rights when the national Congress is not sitting, the Central

which professed allegiance to Nanking but grudgingly complied with its orders only when the leaders

Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee meet in plenary session at regular intervals. In political matters the powers of the Central Executive Committee are exercised by the Central Political Council (sometimes abbreviated into C.P.C.). The Central Political Council meets every Wednesday morning and refers its resolutions directly to the national government. These are dealt with by the Executive Yuan, which meets every Tuesday morning. The standing committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee meets every Monday and Thursday mornings.

The constitution of the Kuomintang was adopted on January 28, 1924, at the First National Congress of the delegates of the Kuomintang and was amended at the Second National Congress of January 16, 1926, by the Third National Congress of March 27, 1929, and by the Fourth National Congress, 1931.

National government—The national government (of which Mr Lin Sen is chairman) is the administrative instrument of the Kuomintang party. It derives its power from the political system of administrative councils and committees devised by the Kuomintang party and framed in an organic law of the national government. The preamble to that law clearly shows its origin and purpose. It says: "The Kuomintang of China, in order to establish the Republic of China on the basis of the Three Principles of the People and the Constitution of Five Powers, which form the underlying principle of the Revolution, having conquered all opposition by military force and having now brought the Revolution from the military stage to the educative stage, deem it necessary to construct a framework for the Constitution of Five Powers with a view to developing the ability of the people to exercise political power, so that constitutional government may soon come into existence and political power be restored to the people; and, further, in virtue of the responsibilities hitherto entrusted to the Party for the guidance and supervision of the Government, do hereby ordain and promulgate the following Organic Law of the National Government." The "Three Principles of the People", mentioned above, comprise the principles of (1) the promotion of popular livelihood and general welfare; (2) the education of the people to understand self-government and exercise the franchise; and (3) the development of nationalism. The process of reconstruction of China was divided into three periods: the period of military operations, the period of political tutelage and the period of constitutional government. The period of political tutelage obligated the government to appoint trained men to assist the people to prepare themselves for local self-government and the eventual exercise of political authority. As each district qualified in self-government it was entitled to elect one representative to the National Assembly and to participate in the government of the nation, the period of provisional constitutional government to begin as soon as any province became fully self-governing.

in those provinces felt that the orders suited them. The provinces were, in fact, semiautonomous, their

The national government consists of five departments (*yuan*) known as the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan. The Executive Yuan consists of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, Navy, Finance, Industries, Education, Communications and Railways, and the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, the Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs, the National Health Administration and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council which sits at Peiping.

National Government Headquarters—While matters of finance, education, industries, communications, diplomacy, internal administration, national defence and other state affairs are handled by the various yuan, ministries or commissions and provincial or district governments, certain other matters come under the direct jurisdiction of the National Government Headquarters: e.g. scientific research (Academia Sinica); general auditing and budgeting (Comptroller General's Office or Directorate General of Accounts, Budgets and Statistics); reconstruction (National Economic Council and National Reconstruction Commission); and military and naval matters (National Military Affairs Commission or National Military Council, Board of General Staff, Directorate General of Military Training, and National Advisory Council or College of Marshals).

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is president of the National Military Council as well as president of the Executive Yuan. He is often wrongly described as president of China. There will be no president of China until the new permanent constitution is adopted and the elections take place.

Permanent Constitution—At the Fifth National Congress of Kuomintang Delegates, which met on November 21, 1935, it was decided to empower the newly elected Central Executive Committee to name the date for the publication of the draft constitution as revised by the new Central Executive Committee in accordance with the proposals of the Congress, and for the convocation of the National People's Congress.

Accordingly the final draft of the new permanent constitution was promulgated on May 5, 1936, and the National People's Congress was convened for November 12, 1936. Circumstances, however, rendered a postponement of the Congress necessary. But at the third plenary session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, held in February of this year, it was resolved to convoke this National People's Congress on the coming November 12 to enact the constitution and to decide on a date for its enforcement.

If the new permanent constitution is adopted next November, it will replace the provisional constitution which was adopted by the National People's Convention in May, 1931. And when the National People's Congress has adopted the permanent constitution it will be dissolved to make way for the formal parliament or National People's Assembly.

leaders refraining from accepting full control by Nanking because of personal grudges against the generalissimo.

In addition to the steps that had to be taken to suppress recalcitrant provincial military leaders another spectre arose. It was in the shape of the remnants of the Communists, who, deprived of their Soviet advisers, collected together in the province of Kiangsi and set to work to establish there what they called a Communist state. Their ruthlessness in destroying the life and property of the people eventually compelled the government to enter upon a campaign against them. This was placed in the hands of the generalissimo.

The Communists were in the most mountainous section of Kiangsi Province. The difficulty of dealing with them was so great at the outset that the government forces found it anything but easy to cope with them. When the Reds entered a new district they commandeered what they wanted, including human beings. Those who would not profess to join their ranks or contribute their all to the common pool and obey every order of the Communist leaders were forthwith and incontinently killed. Blood and fire were rampant.

The near-failure that attended the government troops for a considerable time was eventually converted by reorganization into triumph. They succeeded in evicting the Communists from their

stronghold and in driving them out of Kiangsi. Then began a grim chase over thousands of miles of west China. The Communists adopted guerrilla tactics, refrained whenever possible from engaging the government troops in battle and fled night and day, always in the hope of finding regions where no government troops were stationed. Napoleon said that an army marches on its stomach. If that is true the Communists galloped on theirs. Where the government troops were compelled to proceed as a military unit, the Communists moved on the basis of each man for himself and the devil take the hindmost. They were conspicuous for their capacity to compel the peasantry and others to carry them and their belongings when hard pressed by the pursuing troops. Thus the campaign lasted for a long time and covered a vast region. Not only that, it cost the population the lives and property of hundreds of thousands of people, and the government hundreds of millions of dollars.

Nor were China's ills confined to the difficulties of combatting the ignorance of the people in the endeavour to introduce reform measures and this apparently vain pursuit of the Communists. True to the proverb that troubles never come singly, China found herself swamped by mighty floods, ravaged by drought and menaced by an enterprising and ambitious neighbour desirous of becoming a continental power.

When Chang Hsueh-liang, the son of the assassinated Chang Tso-lin, succeeded his father as the ruler of Manchuria he decided to cancel the autonomy of Manchuria and put those provinces under the control of Nanking. This greatly displeased the Japanese, who specially went out of their way to warn him that if he did so it would, in American parlance, be "just too bad." He defied the Japanese, flew the Chinese national flag in Manchuria and on September 18, 1930 boldly announced acceptance of Nanking rule over Manchuria. At that time the national government was involved in its last and most costly civil war against armies commanded by Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan (now avowed supporters of the national government and the generalissimo) and his intervention with his large Manchurian force helped to effect the collapse of the rebels and the triumph of the national government. His army was given the responsibility of garrisoning the whole of North China from the Great Wall southwards to the Yellow River.

Thus nine months before the Japanese struck at Manchuria some one hundred and fifty thousand of the Manchurian troops were stationed in China proper. Knowing the value of this to them, the Japanese decided to celebrate the anniversary of the acceptance by Chang Hsueh-liang (known as the "young marshal") of Nanking control by taking their revenge. They struck on September 18, 1931.

Without a blush they told the world that they were menaced by two hundred thousand Manchurian troops who threatened to annihilate their forces and compatriots in Manchuria. They omitted to mention that Chang Hsueh-liang's army was not in Manchuria, and they succeeded pretty well in bluffing the world as to the truth of their story.

However, China was not then in the position to resist Japan, and Japan knew it. It is not necessary to attempt to pen any apologia or search for extenuating circumstances. The facts are simple. The Central government was not prepared in any way to undertake a major war with Japan for the simple reason that all of its physical resources were at that time being employed against the Communists and in cementing the unity of the provinces, while its coffers were, in consequence, drained to the limit. The government was forced by circumstances into a very unfortunate position. It had to endure the scorn of the world for not fighting—but the world knew nothing of the conditions and circumstances. Worse than that, it was compelled to suffer the doubts and the questionings of the people of China. The leaders of China resolutely determined that before China could successfully cope with Japan she must put her own house in order, and to do that she must strive more seriously with reorganization than had been her wont. The first necessity was the extermination of the Communists,

for, it must be noted, when the first reaction with regard to Japan's invasion of Manchuria prompted the national government to resist the invaders the Communists began attacking the government. A knife in the back.

The government, under advice, put its Manchurian case in the hands of the League of Nations. It was justified in expecting that the Nine-Power Treaty, the Kellogg Peace Pact and the League of Nations would, somehow or other, be used to exert sufficient influence upon Japan to cause her to suspend her actions and leave China. China, and perhaps the world with it, was horrified to find that the League of Nations was powerless and that the treaty guaranteeing China's administrative and territorial integrity was of no more consequence than the proverbial scrap of paper.

That the Powers who subscribed to the Nine-Power Treaty should leave China in the lurch was a surprise, because that treaty was contrived, not at the instance of China, but virtually in spite of her. It was arranged at the time of the Washington Conference solely because the Powers knew that China was not in a position to defend herself. The Western Powers, realizing the tempting bait that so vast a territory and market would be to any predatory power, decided among themselves, without a by-your-leave or beg-your-pardon to China, to devise a document to protect her whether she wished

it or not. But when the test came and China was attacked, the undertakings of the treaty crumbled, while the great nations who subscribed to it seemed to be more interested in escaping responsibilities than in standing on their feet and requiring all the signatories to live up to their obligations. A mockery was immediately made of that much-vaunted safeguard to national entity known as "collective security", which most men and some nations built their hopes upon. It proved at its first test to be an ignominious, unstable reed, and the League of Nations itself was riven to its very vitals. The pathetic pusillanimity of the Powers at that period not only proved to be the undoing of the hopes of the weak and the small nations, but, like the gyrating boomerang, it swung and smote the Powers themselves to their great and grave discomfiture. The wind was recklessly, or thoughtlessly, sown then, and the devastating whirlwind that was born of it has since raged unchecked in corners and corridors of the world, and the festering debris it has left in its wake lies strewn about for all men to see. And whence, or when, will come the magician to devise the agent that will solder the pieces together so that they will adhere without displaying gaping fractures no man can prophesy.

Out of this tragic evidence of human frailty and international weakness the Chinese learned the lesson to expect nothing from anyone. In most

quarters the Chinese accepted the condition with a philosophy consistent with their age-long teaching. A few were bitter. The wise ones regarded it all as a significant and potent lesson to China—a lesson that would teach the various factions in their country that they must abandon stupidities and follies and learn to goose-step into a position of power which would gain them respect among outside nations. They learned, in short, that not only God, as Napoleon said, but everyone else was on the side of the big battalions. It was not such an easy matter to put the lesson into effect. There was the apathy, the ignorance, the ineptitude—fruit of past ages—to be coped with. There was still the Communist menace, still the grave conditions caused by natural calamities and still the greater task of meeting the tremendous drain upon the resources and finances of the country due to the chaotic aftermath of the revolution.

The years of turmoil had succeeded in shaking the nation to its foundations and in bleeding the people white. Stagnation seemed to be everywhere; despair was rampant, and hope appeared dead. To correct these conditions alone seemed a formidable task. When the Communists were driven from Kiangsi the people of the devastated regions appeared to be stunned and bereft of power to cope with the task of rehabilitating themselves. Out of the contemplation of this gruesome condition sprang

the idea that the people needed spiritual stimulation as well as material help to assist them in the heart-breaking task of seeking in the ashes for the wherewithal to renew the foundations of life.

While the people of the regions previously infested by Communists and bandits were in a virtual state of mental numbness and beggary, the rest of the country suffered from serious economic paralysis. To crown the other miseries of China came the world depression, the falling off in trade, the catastrophic contortions of currency. Altogether it was an unenviable situation for China's leaders. The problem ahead of them seemed to be beyond the power of human capacity and endurance successfully to solve.

It was during this period that the criticism of the world was most severe and the injustice of it more deeply felt. But it did not deter the leaders from courageously tackling the job that lay to their hands. Wherever new brooms were needed new brooms were applied, and the most potent of them was probably the spiritual one.

The apparent demoralization of the people prompted the introduction of the New Life Movement. That movement was designed to give them spiritual help and inspiration. Whereas the original intention was to apply it only in the areas which had suffered from Communist or bandit operations, it quickly spread all over the country. Among other

things it taught the people the spirit of service, co-operation and the requirements of citizenship and its responsibilities. But more significant, it enabled them, in time, to understand the value and power of their own voice. They were taught what they owed to the state and what the state owed to them. As a result there developed a growing public opinion which has ever since been influential in assisting the leaders of the country in correcting maladministration and in requiring loyal service from high officials.

Hand in hand with the New Life Movement came the organization of a movement to rehabilitate rural areas. At a meeting of Christians in the summer of 1933 at the health resort of Kuling, on the Yangtze River, where a study group had been delving into the question of the value of Christianity versus Communism, I challenged the missionary body to show whether Christianity was of practical use or not by lending a hand in the great task of putting the people who had suffered so deeply from the Communist terror back on the land, in their homes and in a state of mental tranquillity. I pointed out that whatever may be said about the Communists, one fact stood out clearly, and that was that they did not spare themselves in applying the things they believed in and did not spare others.

The challenge was taken up by the National

Christian Council operating in China. The result was the formation of the Kiangsi Christian Rural Service Union and later welfare centres under the National Economic Council, the combined work of which has already surprised observers by its magnitude, efficiency and success. Practical efforts of the most important kind are being put forward by these organizations. The people in regions in which they operate enjoy clean and good government apart from numerous other material advantages in the way of improvement in their means of livelihood and their living conditions.

To raise the standard of living of the people another movement was started as complementary to the New Life Movement. It is called the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement. Among its chief proposals it laid down the education of the people to the necessity of developing natural resources and applying systematic and modern scientific methods to various phases of economic life, and particularly to farming. Even at this time the people, whose ignorance and superstitions have for so long prevented the proper development of industry in China, have to be educated out of their old beliefs and superstitions. This significant fact should be weighed very carefully when criticism is being levelled at China for her apparent failure to recognize the value of modern methods and inventions. The work of this movement is now developing at a rapid

pace, and it will not be long before we shall see its effects.

Hitherto provincial jealousies have been an important factor in retarding national unity and progress. They were due mostly to the lack of communications, but they are being broken down rapidly by the construction of motor highways and railways which enable the provincial people to exchange products as well as ideas and to get to know one another by personal contacts. The annihilation of distance by modern means of transport is also doing much to break down the estranging influence of the various dialects which have hitherto prevented most provincials from understanding their compatriots from other provinces. Although there is a written language universal in China and the official spoken language, the bulk of the provincials were previously unable to understand the spoken language of their neighbors in adjoining provinces, to say nothing of those from provinces which are far removed. It was not a rare thing in other days to see two returned students from different provinces solving the language difficulty by conversing in English. The amusing spectacle is not so frequent nowadays since "Kuo-Yu" (or the national language) is universally taught in all schools.

How greatly communications have grown can be gauged by the fact that but a few years ago it was impossible to travel in the western provinces except

by tardy and tedious methods, while now it is possible to drive a motorcar from Shanghai to almost every province in China. One can drive over the farflung southwestern border of China in almost one direct route through Indo-China and Siam to Singapore, and, if political conditions would permit, over the northwestern border through Russia to any point in Europe and Great Britain. It does not require any sharp-edged imagination to estimate what this great change will mean to China and to the world.

Railways have been operating in China for a long time (not as many as there should be, of course), but their construction and maintenance were so costly that building of them practically lapsed during the worst years of trouble in China. During the past few years, however, there has been a marked increase in mileage and the opening up of new regions, and an extensive program for the immediate future is now being carried out. It is even now possible to travel by railway from Canton (or Hongkong) in South China right through to Great Britain or to any big city in any country in Europe. This tremendous road of steel should, even to occidental people who know what long railways are, stagger the imagination.

In addition to the free adoption by China of power vehicles that traverse the crust of Mother Earth, she also has made great progress in the use

of the airplane. Air lines are now operated to most distant parts of China. With the establishment of the Pan-Asiatic service one can travel from America all over China, and from China to Europe by two routes, while a third across Russia only needs the consent of the latter government for it to be inaugurated. In China itself air lines operate regularly to widely separated regions.

Apart from all the airplane does in the interests of commerce and the facilities it offers for the rapid execution of personal business, it has probably made its greatest contribution to China as a transportation factor in the adjustment of political affairs and the establishment of unity. To administer efficiently a great country like China, or any great country for that matter, close contact must be maintained between the officials of the Central government and those of the provinces. Before the advent of the airplane the visits of high officials to the provinces of China were limited mostly to where transportation was easy. To the distant provinces the high officials seldom or never went, but from the time when the airplane came to China the generalissimo and I have used it regularly. With its aid we have been able to fly to all the remote provinces of China. These visits have enabled us to establish direct personal contact with officials whom otherwise we probably never would have seen and to meet peoples strange to us yet under the flag of China. The various prob-

lems which seemed of great magnitude because of the difficulty of handling them and the slowness of correspondence were quickly understood and settled. Good relations and good understanding and confidence between the distant officials and the capital were thus easily established. So it is safe to say that the airplane has been one of the greatest factors in facilitating the unity that China now enjoys.

In addition to purely official business we have been able to comprehend the various problems of the people, the difficulties of their economic life and their living conditions. What perhaps is important is that we were able to use these meetings with the people to establish among them the operation of the New Life Movement. And it is interesting to note that at the same time we took new life to the missionaries from various parts of the world who have established themselves throughout this great country. Both in the near and remote provinces the missionaries do splendid work among the people. They have suffered great handicaps however. In some regions they have had to endure not only opposition but persecution. Realizing the value of their work, we took the opportunity when out in the west to introduce to the local officials and their wives the representatives of the various missions, to encourage them and to enlist their aid in the application of the tenets of the New Life Movement. At every meeting in every large centre that we visited

we formed committees of representatives of the foreign missionary body and the New Life Movement to initiate and carry out programmes of practical work for the amelioration of the lot of the suffering people. We established clinics for drug addicts, for sufferers from trachoma, etc., and we took steps to intensify the campaign against foot-binding, to create midwifery schools and to further other measures for the good of the people. Good reports now come from widely separated centres of the success of the work under this scheme of co-operation. To the airplane can be given the credit for making all this easily possible. Officials now travel largely by air when on long journeys. Not only do they save time, but they accumulate knowledge of their country which they could not otherwise acquire.

On top of the progress in developing communications there has been great advance in the promotion of education, the application of scientific methods in farming, etc., the great work of irrigation and river conservation, etc., to say nothing of very important achievements in currency stabilization, in the liquidation of loans, the abolition of illegal taxation and the relieving of the people from the weight of onerous burdens imposed by grasping militarists in the past.

If China could have been left to herself she would have achieved much more than has been accom-

plished. She has fought incessantly against great odds, not odds coming singly but descending upon her in battalions, as it were. Because of being rendered helpless, in this regard, to protect herself, she has seen large sections of her territory ruthlessly invaded and occupied, and she has seen her neighbour take advantage of circumstances to try to secure economic as well as military domination over the rest of the country, irrespective of treaties or international understandings or the rights or feelings of China.

The ambition of the army leaders of Japan to establish their country as a continental power at the expense of China is by no means a new one. They tried to lay the foundations for that desideratum several times, particularly during the Great War, when, although she was one of the Allies, Japan presented to China a set of demands—to become historically known as the notorious Twenty-One Demands—with the object of obtaining a master hand over the destinies of this country.

Frustrated in obtaining what was then desired and having been compelled to endure setbacks to ambition on other occasions, the military mind did not, however, abandon imperialistic designs. In recent years it has intensified them, and with what results the world well knows.

The Japanese military leaders convinced themselves and have tried to convince others that China

was in process of complete disintegration, and they no doubt believed that they were fully justified in hastening the end for their own purposes. They failed to understand that what they took to be chaos in China was more apparent than real.

The Japanese were not the only foreigners, as I have shown, who misinterpreted the nature of the confusion that came as the aftermath of the revolution. The surprising thing is that they, of all people, were unable to discern the inwardness of it and forgot, or seemed incapable of realizing, the existence of that inert and inherent basic strength of purpose of Chinese character that lay mysteriously hidden beneath the seemingly endless turmoil and recurring epidemics of apparently ineradicable tumult and which is responsible for much in Chinese psychology and actions that seem inexplicable to the foreigner.

The probable influence of centuries of culture should not have been overlooked by observers. It surely should have been calculated to exert an uncommon moral effect somewhere, and at least one not so demoralizing as to permit a potentially great people to be content to see their ancient national heritage dissolve before their eyes or pass willy-nilly into the hands of strangers.

Is it not obvious that from this deep underlying influence spring the Chinese power of passive resistance and their remarkable ability to endure? Suffice it to say then that while the Japanese refrained



Acme—P. & A. Photo

General Chiang Kai-shek (right) and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang (left). This photograph was taken a year before the capture of General Chiang after the mutiny at Sian. At that time the two men were intimate friends.

from laying rough hands upon the people's personal birthright in China proper the people, because of the lethargy that was in them and their complete lack of political-mindedness, as the modern world knows it, did little more than squirm in not much more than silent protest. But once they felt the hostile mailed fist descend with a shock upon their rooftrees and saw the covetousness of strangers menacing the soil of their ancestors, the intelligent among them—and they are legion—began cautiously to take stock of the portentously grave problems that they sensed were developing round and about them.

Out of that significant urge of the spirit of enquiry and the results thereof emerged to view the true collective character of the Chinese. Hitherto it has never been so effectively shown, but it can be accepted as certain that it exists equally in the millions who live by the sweat of their brow as in those who earn their bread with their brains. All of them awoke simultaneously and unexpectedly to register their resentment, assert their nationalism and expose, for all to see, their unrealized possession of patriotic impulses and determination to safeguard their fatherland. The surprising manifestations of national spirit which have been seen in various ways of late were climaxed by the amazing demonstrations that came with the culmination of the Sian coup d'état last December.

Demonstrated unity then definitely came to China, and the Japanese, strangely enough, were the last to expect such a thing but among the first to recognize its serious import when it did become apparent. While they have always asserted that they desired a strong and united China their sincerity on this point has always been questioned by the Chinese since the invasion and occupation of Manchuria and the subsequent wholesale smuggling that has been going on for some time in the north of China proper, which might well have destroyed China's credit and ruined her substance and her strength.

The Japanese have always worked on the premise that a strong and united China would mean a weak Japan. They seem never to have been able to see far enough to realize that the sine qua non of strength and unity in China would be peace and prosperity, with the natural concomitants of a higher standard of living and an increased purchasing power.

Some of their economists, their financiers, their industrialists and their merchants may have realized that expanding profitable trade comes through friendly relationships with potential purchasers, but if they did they were unable to make their voices heard to any extent in the councils of the military, who, flushed with relatively easy victory in so-called "foreign wars" and filled with ardent

ambition, fancied that compulsion could secure more customers than the attraction of cheapness which hitherto had led to the purchase by the Chinese of great quantities of Japanese manufactured and natural products.

This type of commercial development did not please the Japanese military men because they coveted more than commerce. They wanted the soil of China and what was of it and in it. Where legitimate pursuance of commercial activities and industrial co-operation could have built up for Japan, on a basis of friendship, an increasingly vast and profitable trade with China, the military leaders apparently wanted something more substantial than mere buying and selling with its constant uncertain market vagaries.

They wanted ownership, and in their varied efforts to acquire it they have provided the world with what competent foreign critics describe as a spectacle of successful achievement in three wrong directions. In China, which should be Japan's greatest dependable market and where friendship should have been assiduously cultivated at all costs, they have not only sown the seeds of hatred, but they have awakened a great population out of a long passive sleep and inspired it with militant determination to protect its hearths and homes. In the outside world they have filled various nations with deep distrust and have also awakened a dangerous and

costly militant spirit. In their own country political and economic conditions have been created which foreign observers describe as near-catastrophic and which have tended to shatter foreign belief in the substantiality of Japan's moral and material foundations.

They have, in short, sacrificed much of that quality and character which Japan has been assiduously acquiring with the expenditure of so much energy, skill and treasure over so long a period of time to set herself up in good standing in the business and title of a first-class Power. All this has happened mostly because the Japanese army leaders believed, as I have said, that China as a nation would easily crumble and succumb, but why they believed it I do not know.

Instead of China's collapsing under the pressure of their political intrigues and military engines the unexpected and opposite happened. Unity came to China, and accompanying it came what might be called sanity. But there also came an awakening for the Japanese military leaders, for by the end of the autumn of 1936 they could not refuse to recognize that China could not be coerced into accepting the conditions they hoped to impose to give them control of great regions in the northern part of China proper.

Just at the time that the Japanese ambassador vainly endeavoured to persuade China to accept cer-

tain demands the generalissimo was detained at Sian. This act of folly on the part of the military officers in charge at Sian (Generals Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-chen, et al) seemed at the outset to have serious possibilities. The world was shocked; China was more shocked. The pessimists everywhere had a few field days because of false reports, but the generalissimo was released on Christmas Day after being held in captivity since December 12. The main aspects of that incident are revealed in the following chapters. There it is clearly enough shown that the motive behind the detention was not that originally believed by the world as a result of propaganda issued from certain sources. The generals responsible violated military law and committed an outrage against a superior officer which renders them unfit to command, but they did not kill the generalissimo, nor did they demand money or anything material. The revolt of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, on the other hand, was directed towards the generalissimo's discomfiture, notwithstanding that it professed to have behind it the object of developing a national campaign against Japan.

Both these incidents show, however, that a new state of mind has been developing in China—lack of fear of Japan replacing the old-time terror of that overambitious country, and an increasing desire for resistance. Such a spirit had a remarkably stimulat-

ing influence. The Japanese, although they expressed resentment that China should even think of defending her soil, were not slow to realize what was happening or to discern the danger lurking behind the dramatic change of front.

A united, fearless China was something they had not counted upon, nor were they counting upon such a possibility as now confronted them of being constrained to recognize the expediency, if not the desirability, of revising their attitude towards China and accepting her in negotiations upon a basis of mutual esteem and equality.

China, as the world knows, has had neither the means nor the desire to be aggressive. She is therefore ready and willing, without question, to terminate this period of difficulty and danger in an amicable way providing her territorial and administrative integrity are fully respected and that she is accorded the respect and right of co-existence to which she is entitled as a great nation evolving rapidly, if painfully, from an ancient chrysalis, and possessed of the right to defend herself against assault or invasion whenever such may occur. This is what China, in common with any other self-respecting state, expects and demands.

In connection with all this an international development which presages significant if not far-reaching influence upon the Far Eastern situation is the sudden determined reversal of the attitude of

Great Britain with respect to rearmament; her energetic demonstration that at all costs she intends to maintain her commercial status in the China market and islands further south; and the effect those two phases of policy have had upon the Japanese mind and, incidentally, upon China's future. There was immediate reaction. On the one hand Great Britain made overtures to China to resume interest in her reconstruction, and conversations are at this writing proceeding between representatives of Great Britain and China to explore avenues of possible economic co-operation. On the other hand Japan made overtures to Great Britain to remove the causes of recent estrangement and to restore former friendly co-operative relations. The centre of conversations for both is London, towards which world metropolis Eastern eyes are all turned, and, no doubt, many occidental ones as well.

The subject of interest to both Great Britain and Japan is their policies towards China, and since Great Britain has reiterated her intention not to engage in any arrangement which will in any way encroach upon, or detrimentally affect, China's sovereignty, her rights or her status, the Chinese people are able to observe the manoeuvring with a certain amount of calmness and confidence. This determination of Great Britain to revise her policy and furnish up her sword is born of the effect upon her and the world of the tragic consequences of the failure

of the League of Nations to bring the enforcement of collective security within the realm of practical politics.

The pious belief that the league would supplant the erring type of diplomacy that had hitherto failed to avert war and that nations would be able to spend the rest of their days basking in the sunshine of profitable exchange of products was rudely shattered. And more than that, the old processes of international law or understandings or consuetudinary practices which automatically obliged actual armed conflict or invasion to be preceded by a declaration of war disappeared, and a new concept came into being under which countries could be invaded and seized without any declaration of war at all. Nor could any sanctions be adequately enforced against the aggressor nations.

The full significance of the reason for this sad state of affairs gradually dawned upon a virtually disarmed Great Britain, with the result that resolute decision to be able to hold her own and assert her views brought her back on the stage armed cap-a-pie and full of potential menace. That the military leaders of Japan should desire to renew cordial relationship with their old ally is consequently natural, and it is fairly certain that the sober civilian elements of Japan will welcome a Britain persuasively strong enough to assist in the adjustment of relations with China so that the great market of this country can

be freely approached by Japanese merchants on a basis of friendship and not merely on one of sufferance. The question is: Will the army leaders of Japan remain reluctant to abandon their idea that it will be easy for them to bend China to their will? If they do realize that circumstances are now such that Japan will lose by war and profit by peace there is a surety that the conversations now proceeding in London between the Japanese ambassador and the British officials will be of world-wide advantage.

The conversations going on between the Chinese and British representatives are undisguisedly aimed at establishing a co-operative basis for assistance in the development of China. There is so much to be done in rehabilitating China, and there is so large a field for enterprise, that these conversations are not secret or mysterious or significant of danger to anyone. They may be repeated in the capitals of any friendly countries desirous of economic participation in China, and there is room for all who seek similar opportunities either to invest or to sell and buy goods, provided that China is free to expand and prosper by being relieved from the danger and consequences of any external pressure. Whether or not tangible results will accrue to China remains to be seen, but at least she is sure to benefit from her internal unity that has revived international confidence in her and from the results of that confidence

in the shape of readjustments of international attitudes with relation to her. China, as I have said, merely asks for international sympathetic understanding of her problems. She does not want favors, and she does not want patronage. She would like to be accorded a square deal and an unrestricted chance to carry on so that she may, in time, catch up with the progressive countries of the world in organized administration and life. For the reasons I have given China has appeared to have wilfully lagged behind, but for the first time in her history she is approaching an opportunity to advance to her proper position in the family of nations, and the question is: Will she get it?

One of the most outstanding of China's achievements, which must not be forgotten and which must be increasingly reckoned with, is the emancipation of women. Prior to the overthrow of the Manchus the average woman in the country was on a plane distinctly subservient to the men. Whatever power she may have wielded in the home, she was taught that in the eyes of those outside of the family circle she was supposed to be invisible. It is facetiously said that in China the women wear the trousers and the men the skirts. Actually, in the vast interior, this is sartorially true nowadays. When the men, of the level of the intelligentsia, released from the Manchu custom, shed their queues the women of the better classes hid their trousers and began to appear in

public dressed in gowns which gained in elegance as time went on and which have now succeeded in making a distinct place for themselves in fashion pages. More than that, the women began to assert themselves in a wide variety of directions. Where, hitherto, in public places there was a notable absence of women they are now making their mark as competent executives. In political spheres they are beginning to exercise significant influence. In educational and social service circles they are particularly prominent. In the work of the New Life Movement they are making important contributions to the betterment of living conditions. The release of womanhood from comparative bondage will do much to enhance the progress that will characterize the future if China is allowed to pursue her own way, and they will undoubtedly influence development along peaceful lines.

With a fair chance China will surely emerge a modernized nation capable of contributing vastly to the economic as well as, it is hoped, to the spiritual betterment of the world. All that she needs is sympathetic understanding. She does not object to criticism. She asks only intellectual honesty in criticism and the benefit of realization of the nature and difficulty of her problems. I have mentioned some of them, and I repeat that the most unjust critics, the most misleading writers on China, have been those who do not know and who have not troubled to

learn what are the real causes of China's apparent so-called incapacity and her believed inability or reluctance to employ modern methods wholesale in her rehabilitation and development.

China does not deserve the reputation that has been thrust upon her. But, as I pointed out above, shortsighted and uncharitable views should no doubt be ascribed mostly to some unpleasant personal experiences or to the Occident's failure to take into consideration the centuries of background of the Chinese race. Occidentals have thought that what they could accomplish in their organized generation and country could be easily accomplished in China in spite of the fact that the nation still is in its republican swaddling clothes and but a few years ago knew nothing at all about modern systems of government or so-called constitutional practices, to say nothing of industrial and other kinds of development.

Considering that China overthrew a dynasty, then successfully combatted the various elements who endeavoured to seize authority by force and at the same time maintained national entity, the results compare more than favorably with what happened in some occidental countries when the fate of the nation was decided by revolution.

In reality the metamorphosis that is taking place in China is so belated when compared with the period of progressive change in other lands that

it is too close to the eyes of observers from already organized countries (who are ignorant of China's past) for them to get it in proper perspective. And when endeavouring to arrive at an honest appreciation of the values of changes in China—more so, perhaps, than anywhere else—it is vitally necessary that everything should be in correct perspective.

It must be emphasized that to obtain a reliable estimate of China in her stage of transformation at this period it is completely misleading to apply foreign standards. China must be measured by Chinese standards, with accurate knowledge of her immediate as well as her ancient past to serve as a yardstick. Otherwise it is inevitable that unwarranted and inaccurate conclusions should be arrived at. One has to be particularly meticulous about realities in China in order to prevent prejudice distorting judgment.

When the republic was inaugurated there were many who apparently imagined that the age of miracles was still with us, for they thought that China could effect the transition from an effete monarchy to an up-to-the-minute progressive republic overnight without disturbing in any way the even tenor of the way of the political or economic expert or the travelling man with his metaphorical carpetbag.

There was pathetic disappointment because foreigners failed successfully to dazzle the newly eman-

cipated people with their nostrums and notions, guaranteed, at a price, to cure everything from political myopia to economic myalgia. Out of that disappointment sprang many misconceptions and misunderstandings.

But things are not as bad as they were, though China has to live down much that has been said and written against her. As the years have passed, however, it has been learned by many Chinese that Western measures might be adapted with success to our civilization if discretion and wisdom are employed. Where that discovery has been made and digested progress has become more rapid.

But, as a last word, it may be said that if ever the misfortune comes China can now return to her self-contained condition in defence of her honour even better than she was able to centuries ago.

SIAN: A COUP D'ÉTAT

By Mayling Soong Chiang

(MME CHIANG KAI-SHEK)

FAR from being the stage setting for a Gilbert and Sullivan comic opera as visualized by certain American writers, Sian was, to me, the battleground of a significant moral struggle upon the outcome of which hinged the future of China. What happened at Sian during the fortnight beginning December 12 last was not a rebellion as we know such politico-military upheavals in China. It had special and significant features of its own, but with possibilities graver than any civil war that has hitherto besmirched the history of our republic. In it were involved explosive elements of personal, national and international problems and policies of first magnitude.

To try to bring them into proper and understandable perspective at this close date is difficult. To do so it is necessary to discard one's personal

feelings and objectively study the various factors which so swiftly swung into activity when, like a thunderclap out of a clear sky, came the shock of the news that my husband, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, had been captured in a mutiny at Sian, the capital of Shensi Province.

That news was broken to me by Dr H. H. Kung, minister of finance, who came full of anxiety to my Shanghai home, where I was holding a conference in connection with the reorganization of the Commission of Aeronautical Affairs,¹ one of the tasks upon which I had been engaged for some time previously.

"There has been a mutiny, and there's no news of the generalissimo."

These words, falling from the lips of Dr Kung, sounded ominous, even to one who has been long accustomed to peril and dangerous situations. Nor did any news come for many hours, all telegraph and radio communications with Sian having been dislocated. But those who wanted news were not baffled. Rumours, ridiculous and startling, quickly supplied the need and, astonishing to say, found credence and much publicity. Newspapers the world around printed them with screaming headlines.

Nanking, the capital, was as much in the dark as Shanghai, but I, with Dr Kung and Mr W. H.

¹Mme Chiang Kai-shek is the secretary-general of the Commission of Aeronautical Affairs, which post she assumed early in 1936 in order to effect radical reorganization.

Donald (whom I had asked to fly to Sian) hastened there.

I found that while official circles had been astounded by the unexpected nature of the coup and were wrought up to a state of high tension, members of the standing committee of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Political Council had met late on Saturday night and had taken action. They had deprived Chang Hsueh-liang, the leader of the mutiny, of his position as a member of the Military Affairs Commission and concurrently acting commander-in-chief of the Northwestern Bandit Suppression Forces, and referred him to the Military Affairs Commission for severe punishment. In a mandate they denounced him bitterly.

Earlier in the day a circular telegram had come from Sian, signed by Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-chen (the pacification commissioner of Shensi) and their leading officers, and bearing the alleged signatures of a number of Central government officials then in Sian. In this telegram a number of charges were made which, the telegram said, "made their hair stand on end." They said that they had "advised him (the generalissimo) with tears, but were repeatedly chastised," and that they "therefore tendered our last advice to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, while guaranteeing his safety, in order to stimulate his awakening." And having done that,

they set forth a group of eight demands, described as "points of national salvation", which they hoped the Nanking authorities would "stoop" to adopt "so as to open one line of life for the future."

The eight points called for the reorganization of the Nanking government; the cessation of civil war (clearly referring to the anti-Communist campaign); the immediate release of several members of the National Salvation Association who had been arrested in Shanghai; the release of all political prisoners; the removal of restrictions upon patriotic movements; the granting of free speech to the press and assemblies of people; execution of the will of the late Dr Sun; and the immediate convocation of a National Salvation Conference.

This was the situation, wrapped in increasing excitement and concern, as we found it when we reached Nanking on Sunday morning, December 13.

I was brought face to face with a national situation, vibrant with passion and fantastic possibilities, and in which I had a grave personal interest. I quickly was to learn that I was regarded as a woman who could not be expected to be reasonable in such a situation, but I more swiftly realized that if a common-sense solution was to be sought I must assert my views and insist upon a sane line of action being taken.

While expressing misgivings as to the wisdom of

hastily penalizing Chang Hsueh-liang before the full facts of the situation were known or before Dr Kung and I had arrived in Nanking, I was faced with a much more serious problem; to wit, what looked to me like an unhealthy obsession on the part of leading military officers who asserted that they felt it their inexorable duty to mobilize the military machine forthwith and launch an immediate punitive expedition to attack Sian.

To my mind this was a point of view that was intolerable. It may be that military requirements necessitated such a thing and that the generalissimo expected it, but I was completely unable to reconcile myself to it. So, rightly or wrongly, I decided to fight it and strive for a quick, calm and bloodless settlement of the whole affair.

Before 8 A.M. I telegraphed Chang Hsueh-liang that Mr Donald was flying that day to Sian. Mr Donald also telegraphed, and we hoped for an early reply.

We sought news everywhere, but there was a complete absence of it. All around me there was excitement; there was all manner of speculation as to possible happenings; and there were all the shouting and tumult that can be imagined in such circumstances. Nor did I know then that telegraph communications with Sian had been interrupted.

I had stormy conferences with the nation's leaders. I pleaded for calmness of judgment pending

the receipt of definite news, for the avoidance of precipitate action and for confidence in the spiritual resources of our people. I urged that the leaders in Sian, until proved otherwise, should be taken at their word, but every effort should be speedily made to get at the truth.

"Perhaps they have a legitimate grievance," I hazarded. "And if one section of the country has a grievance against the Central administration let us, in a spirit of humility, discover what that grievance is and do all in our power to put it right. After all," I added, "we are all Chinese—don't let's fight if we can find a way out of it."

I did not take the eight points mentioned in the telegram of the Sian leaders seriously. Nor did anyone else at the beginning. It was known that Chang's men were dissatisfied with the barren conditions of the Northwest, so it was surmised that these purely political conditions were merely an excuse in order to bargain for terms for richer provinces. This belief, perhaps, influenced those who advocated an immediate punitive expedition.

Early in the morning two other delayed telegrams arrived from Chang Hsueh-liang, one to Dr Kung and one to me. I regarded the one to me as somewhat impertinent in its references to the generalissimo. At first reading it angered me. Then several thoughts flashed through my mind. Did Chang really sign the telegram? Was he not having

trouble with his men? If he did sign it was it done in an outburst of anger?

The awaited replies from Chang Hsueh-liang regarding Mr Donald's visit did not come. To save time Mr Donald, after lunch, left by airplane for Loyang with Colonel J. L. Huang, whom I sent in case an interpreter should be necessary.

Through Mr Donald I sent to the generalissimo a letter in which I tried to comfort him with the thought that I knew that whatever he had done had always been for the sole purpose of benefiting the nation, saying that I commended him to God and that I would continue to pray for him.

To Chang Hsueh-liang I wrote a long letter pointing out to him the disastrous effects his action would have upon the unity of the nation and expressing my belief that he meant no harm to the country or to the generalissimo by his imprudent and impetuous action; but that he should retrieve himself before it was too late.

Mr Donald telephoned to me in the evening that he had arrived at Loyang at sunset to find that although the officials there were but one and a half hours flight from Sian they were just as badly off for news as were we at Nanking. He had learned that some twenty planes had made a demonstration flight over Sian that day just to show the mutineers that the government was still in charge of the air-field. Chang Hsueh-liang had ordered his artillery

section at Loyang to seize the field, but they had decided to disobey the order, so the government had a large, well-equipped air base in close proximity to Sian from which to operate. Mr Donald said that he would fly to Sian next morning whether he heard from Chang Hsueh-liang or not, but during the night I received a wire addressed to Mr Donald from Chang Hsueh-liang asking him to go there, and that removed the apprehension I felt that his plane might be fired at.

The duties of the generalissimo had automatically been assumed by the minister of war, and he took over the air force, but despite this I went ahead with the plans for the reorganization of the Commission on Aeronautical Affairs. Not only was the work vital, but it provided me with activity and mental and physical escape.

Around me it was already being whispered that my husband was dead or that if he were still living he certainly never would escape from Sian alive. In my presence people were thoughtful, gracious and sympathetic; but behind my back, during the next few days, the atmosphere was heavy with pessimism. Condemnation of the Sian leaders was universal and unrestrained.

From the beginning it was my supreme belief that I should exert all my powers to make any necessary sacrifice and, whatever the cost, to do the right thing in dealing with these men of the

Northwest now holding my husband. At no time did I heap imprecations upon their heads. I have always firmly believed that only sincerity and truth could establish lasting foundations; and that kind of diplomacy which depended for success upon securing advantages through shrewdness and skilled double-dealing never had any appeal for me. Sian has considerably deepened that conviction.

I could not shake off the feeling that there was a way out of what then looked a black, ugly and desperate situation if I could only make people see it. So I argued for restraint before cutting off possibilities for peaceful settlement; for the exploration of all possible avenues to secure the release of the generalissimo before launching an attack and thus condemning him to death at the hands of angry soldiers or people, if not by the bombs and bullets of his own troops.

But I found myself running full tilt into the military mind in full panoply for action.

I was told that the generalissimo should not have risked his life in such an unwise and unnecessary way.

I retorted: "If the generalissimo is worthy of his position he should risk his life whenever necessary. It should not be his business to look after his personal safety," I pointed out, "since his only consideration is for the welfare of his country and his whole time is absorbed with national affairs. Rather

it is the duty of his subordinates and people around him to see to it that he is adequately protected. If he thought of his personal safety above everything else, then he would not be worthy of being the leader of the country."

"To uphold properly the prestige of the national government," it was stated, "requires a display of force forthwith."

"At this period of national crisis there would and could not be any national government," I replied, "without the generalissimo. Aside from him, just mention the name of a man among you who has the qualities and character of a national leader."

"Anyway, the generalissimo is already dead," said some.

"What is the life of one man compared with that of the state?" asked another.

"She is a woman pleading for the life of her husband," was one taunt repeated to me.

"I am a woman," I retorted, "but I am speaking not as a wife trying to save her husband's life. If it is necessary that the generalissimo should die for the good of the country I would be the first one to sacrifice him, but, to my mind, to use military force and to attack and bombard Sian would not only endanger the life of the generalissimo, who is the universally recognized leader of the country, but would also cause untold misery and suffering to thousands of innocent civilians as well as waste our

military force, which should be conserved for national defence. Let us see whether or not any channels are open through which we may come to a peaceful settlement.

"Believe me, gentlemen," I continued, specially addressing high military and party officials, "when I tell you that I am making this appeal to you, not as a woman thinking of the safety of her husband, but as a citizen taking a dispassionate and realistic attitude to secure the least costly solution of a grave national problem. In no circumstances would I hesitate to sacrifice myself and my husband if such a sacrifice could be of the least benefit to the nation. But what you are proposing today actually endangers the life of the generalissimo, and since in the mind of the people as well as in my own mind the generalissimo's safety is inseparable from the continued unity and even existence of the nation itself at this critical period of our history, no effort should be spared to secure his release by peaceful means."

"Place the armies in position if you so desire, but do not fire a single shot," I urged. "Meanwhile let us use every effort to secure his release. If peaceful means fail, then it is not too late to use force. I believe that time will prove that my envisagement of this situation and my idea of how it should be solved will prove correct. I know that you are just as sincere, according to your lights, as I am, but

I am so confident that mine is the correct attitude that I shall use every means possible to have my ideas made effective. Imprecations will never conquer the rebels and cannot help to solve the situation."

When I added that I would personally fly to Sian to see what might be done, my suggestion was received with stern disapproval. I met opposition on all sides. Rumours were repeated that blood and fire and disaster were unrestrainedly rife at Sian. The pessimists and the advocates of action were sure that the generalissimo would be killed, if he were not already dead. I was told that my going would be futile; that I would risk my life unnecessarily; that I would be captured and tortured to make my husband submit to demands; that I would be held as a hostage; and, at the very least, that I would complicate matters.

It was difficult to be philosophic, difficult to hold on to faith in the face of the despair and despondency which surrounded me. I failed to see eye to eye with the pessimists, but at times I asked myself if the end had really come to all our endeavour to help the people out of their trials. I found myself wondering if our plans for national reconstruction and betterment were destined to crash about our ears. I could not tell, but I held on to faith. More and more I am coming to know that it is "faith that removes mountains" and that if wrongs are

to be righted we must have abiding faith in God and in our fellow men.

I was troubled because this was the only time in years that I had not gone with the generalissimo on his trip, having been prevented from doing so by illness. I had the feeling constantly with me that if I had been in Sian this situation would not have developed. Thoughts of this nature were not, however, much of a mental comfort or consolation. Nor were my disturbed feelings eased at all by the flock of visitors who came to offer sympathy and seek news or to give what was regarded as news.

I had not one moment to myself, and much time was spent with the heads of various organizations who came asking for guidance in their attitude towards this situation. Among these were representatives of the Alumni Association of the Whampoa Military Academy. These were students of my husband, and they earnestly urged me to speak to them. So I addressed a large assembly.

I urged them, as I was urging their superiors, to suspend all judgment until they were sure of the facts, to take a calm and dispassionate view and do nothing and say nothing which would arouse increasing resentment and anger on the part of the populace against those responsible for the outrage at Sian. I told them I had asked Mr Donald to go to Sian to ascertain the exact facts of the case, as up to that time no one had left or entered Sian,

and that all we knew of the position were the telegrams which had been sent to Dr Kung and to me, and the circular telegram that had been sent to the government and various organizations. I told them that the generalissimo regarded them as his own sons, and now, if ever, was the time that they should bear in mind his teachings. Although he had done great things for the country in unifying the army the greatest and most constructive contribution he had yet made to the nation was the founding of the New Life Movement. They, his students, should not only continue promoting the New Life Movement, but they should actually live according to its tenets. I emphasized that it was my firm belief that the rebels at Sian would repent when they realized the repercussions of their action upon the country. The road to repentance must be kept open and channels of negotiations maintained, I argued. If the rebels showed true repentance the Whampoa cadets² should be big enough to forgive them and bring them back to the fold. "I am not trying," I added, "to excuse them, for there is no excuse, but I am trying to make them see how terribly national welfare is being endangered by their actions and that it is not too late for them to make amends."

No tribute that I could pay to Dr Kung and to my sisters, Mme Kung and Mme Sun Yat-sen, to

²The Whampoa cadets, taught under the generalissimo, are now officers throughout the national army.

all my brothers and to my close friends for the comfort they tendered me in these hours of mental anguish and physical trial could be too great. Their solicitude was only matched by their philosophy in the face of what, in the silence that enshrouded everything at Sian, looked like stark tragedy. Dr Kung, as acting president of the Executive Yuan and therefore the chief officer of the state, was in a particularly difficult position. While he held to his line of duty, he had abundant sympathy for the policy for which I was fighting.

Late on Monday evening, December 14, the first real glimpse of hope, the first tangible justification for my confidence, came in the form of a telegram from Mr Donald, then at Sian, saying that the generalissimo was well, that he was comfortably housed and that he (Mr Donald) was with him. This telegram added that Han-ching (Chang Hsueh-liang) urged Dr Kung to go to Sian and especially wished me to go and assured me that no harm was intended to the generalissimo.

To me it was amazing that doubts were cast upon the telegram sent by Mr Donald. The minds of some people had been made up that the generalissimo was in a serious position, if he were not dead, and they were reluctant to believe anything to the contrary. They argued that Mr Donald was sending a message designed to please the Sian people and lure Dr Kung, the finance minister, to Sian,

so that those responsible for the coup would have an additional captive and therefore a stronger hold in making terms. The wire from Chang Hseuh-liang to me was interpreted in some quarters as a scheme to lure me to Sian to hold me as a hostage.

These fantastic theories, instead of impressing me, added to my convictions that it was more and more important that I should persist in the policy I was following to avoid fighting. I made desperate efforts to go to Sian, and be it said that Dr Kung, as well as each of my sisters and brothers, offered to go with me.

Those favouring fighting did not seem to me to be overmerciful in their endeavours to frustrate my persistency, and in the heat of arguments there did not appear to be much time for gentleness.

It was at this time that I learned that telegraph communications with Sian had been definitely interrupted somewhere and that wires were being censored, but I received a surprise on Tuesday afternoon (December 15) when I heard Mr Donald talking to me from Loyang by long-distance telephone. He had flown there that morning, through bad weather, to give me direct information of the situation at Sian. He painted a swift picture. He confirmed that the generalissimo was not being ill-treated; that he had consented, on Mr Donald's arrival, to move to a comfortable house; that the

generalissimo had then, for the first time, talked to some extent with Han-ching, though he was still furious and resentful; that Han-ching had expressed his determination to go with the generalissimo to Nanking, because what he had done, though wrong, was with good motives; that Han-ching particularly wished me to go there, as well as Dr Kung, and assured me of the high respect in which he and his associates held me; that the generalissimo had instructed that I be told not to go to Sian on any account.

I urged Mr Donald to fly to Nanking next day, but he refused, stating that he had promised the generalissimo and Han-ching to return to Sian that day, but as the weather prevented flying, he would return to Sian the following morning. I told him that the military officers were determined to attack Sian at once; that in such an event death would come to the generalissimo and others; and that if he returned there he, too, probably would be killed. I urged him to inform the generalissimo of the situation. He told me that although he could not go to Nanking Mr James C. Elder (a close friend of Chang Hsueh-liang), who had come from Sian with him, would leave next morning for Nanking, could tell me all that had happened and would take a letter to me, giving me further information.

Later that night I telephoned Mr Donald, telling him that doctors advised against Dr Kung's flying

to Sian, but in any case he could not leave, as he was acting as head of the government. I asked him to find out from Han-ching if T. V. Soong (my brother) and General Ku Chu-tung (a trusted officer of the generalissimo, then chairman of Kweichow Province) would be acceptable instead of Dr Kung. I informed him that every effort was being made to prevent my going, but that in spite of everything I was determined to go. I asked him whether or not he had sent out any news telegrams, as it was being said that he was supporting Chang Hsueh-liang. He told me he had sent only two telegrams, one a short news summary and one a brief reply to a message from Mr Hallett Abend, the New York *Times* correspondent.

During the day Mr Donald's wire to Mr Abend, which briefly explained that the generalissimo was well and that his detention was acknowledged as wrong by Han-ching, who claimed that his motives were in national interests, was brought to me as further evidence that Mr Donald was supporting Chang Hsueh-liang and was falsifying facts. I was puzzled by this point of view, ascribed it to military mentality and telegraphed Mr Donald not to send any more wires for publication.

Correspondents and newspaper men who had become accustomed to getting replies from Mr Donald whenever or wherever he had been in remote places with the generalissimo consequently could

not understand his silence, and many jumped to the conclusion that things were not at all well at Sian, that he also had been seized or that worse things had happened. This added to the confusion of thought that was now rampant as a result of military censorship and may have been partly responsible for the grossly wild rumours that sprang into circulation to replace the absence of news. Sian was dead from the news point of view.

On Wednesday morning I again phoned to Mr Donald just before he left for Sian. I told him to persuade Han-ching to let the generalissimo return at once if he did not want to be responsible for dire calamity, and I urged him once more to give the generalissimo an understanding of the situation as it concerned me and to explain clearly that I was doing my utmost to prevent any fighting.

"Fly back to Nanking from Sian," I urged him.

"No, I'll stay there," he replied. And my last words were: "Then you'll be killed if I cannot stop the fighting."

"There may be another way," he said, "but I cannot say more."

Dr Kung took the telephone from me and asked Mr Donald to tell Chang Hsueh-liang that his very existence, to say nothing of his reputation, depended upon the safeguarding of the generalissimo and that Chang could save himself and the country if he would fly the generalissimo to Taiyuanfu and

release him. If he would do that, Dr Kung promised, everything would be forgiven.

Then I waited with whatever patience I could muster for the plane that was to leave Loyang for Nanking with Mr Elder on board. It was forced down at Pengpu, an hour's flight to the north, and Mr Elder did not see me till midnight. From him I learned that the generalissimo had been injured somehow by a fall; that the whole thing was unexpected; that when daylight of December 12 came he found that all of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops at Sian had been disarmed by General Yang, who was in charge of the city and whose permits had to be obtained, even by Chang Hsueh-liang's men, to pass through the gates; that Chang Hsueh-liang had only four hundred troops as bodyguards in the city and only about six thousand outside, and that these constituted the anti-aircraft force in control of the airfield; that it was not till later in the afternoon that arms were restored to Chang Hsueh-liang's forces; that in the meantime a body of Yang troops had gone to the airfield to drain gasoline from the tanks of a number of government airplanes grounded there; that their idea of doing that was to bayonet the tanks and destroy the planes; that they had been dissuaded by Mr Elder; that the anti-aircraft guns were then covered to prevent anyone's trying to use them; that all the staff was sent off the field and only the usual sentries

were kept there; that Colonel Huang had seen the generalissimo the previous day but had been prevented from leaving for Nanking because the generalissimo had written a letter for him to deliver to me. As the generalissimo had read the letter aloud, Mr Elder was able to give me the contents of it, and it showed that the generalissimo was ready to die rather than comply with anything while under duress and was of opinion that his end was near in any event, for he expressed what he wished me to do when he died.

Mr Donald's last sentence when speaking to me on the telephone from Loyang was significant and had kept ringing in my ears. I therefore asked Mr Elder the whereabouts of the Boeing (Chang Hsueh-liang's airplane). When he replied that it was at Sian I asked him if he thought Chang Hsueh-liang had any idea of flying off with the generalissimo in case of an attack upon Sian.

"That is possible," he answered.

"I believe that is what is afoot," I remarked and asked him where was Barr (Julius Barr, Chang Hsueh-liang's chief pilot).

"In Hankow," he surprised me by saying.

"Then who is flying the Boeing?" I questioned, and when he replied, "Leonard" (Royal Leonard, Chang Hsueh-liang's second pilot), I asked if he could ask Barr to come from Hankow to see me at Nanking.

"Madam," he replied, "we are all entirely at your service. Of course I will, and Barr will do anything you wish."

I asked him to wire Barr to come as soon as possible.

This conversation revealed facts of which we knew nothing before. They seemed to show that Chang Hsueh-liang was not in a position to protect the generalissimo if other troops got out of control, and I became doubly determined to prevent an attack on the city if I could, notwithstanding that the generalissimo himself expected and wanted it, irrespective of the consequences to him or to his life.

I did not disclose to the military officers the contents of his letter to me, however, for that would have aggravated my position and would have given them support for immediate drastic action. Bombing of Sian certainly would have brought about the death of the generalissimo, but I was of the opinion that his life was of more value to China than his death could be, and I fought harder than ever to save it and became more determined than ever to go to Sian despite the realization that was now forced upon me that Chang Hsueh-liang had no troops inside the city walls and had but a handful outside. This was not a pleasant situation to contemplate.

But some hope came to me that there was a defi-

nite possibility for a peaceful, rather than a forceful, settlement of the affair.

During the night I received a radio from Mr Donald saying that he had got back to Sian, had delivered my telephone messages to both the generalissimo and Han-ching and that the Sian officials would welcome T. V. Soong and General Ku.

Here was justification for me to persist in every effort to have the release of the generalissimo effected by peaceful means.

The days that followed were days of intense agony and activity for me. Military forces had been in action already, east of Sian, and although snowstorms at Sian prevented planes from crossing the mountains I never knew when some plane or other might get through and bomb the city as they were bombing points along the railway line between Loyang and the mountains.

The tension was somewhat relieved when I received a radio from Mr Donald saying that the generalissimo was dispatching General Chiang Ting-wen³ to Nanking with an autographed letter to the minister of war, ordering cessation of bombing and fighting for three days.

This news caused some government officials to state again that they would neither negotiate with Sian nor accept any letter or order, even in the

³One of the highest officers in the army, who was with the generalissimo at Sian, having been appointed commander-in-chief of the Northwestern Bandit Suppression Forces.

generalissimo's own handwriting, since he might have been forced to write them.

I told them they insulted their leader if they thought he would do anything under duress. "How little you who have worked so long with him understand his true character," I sighed. But when General Chiang Ting-wen arrived two days later and they heard his story they decided to obey the generalissimo's orders.

General Chiang Ting-wen urged them to prevent any widening of the breach between Nanking and Sian by stopping the broadcasting of imprecations and maledictions and vicious newspaper articles.

Other efforts were similarly being made to restrain antagonism and secure a settlement. Mr Sun Fo (Dr Sun Yat-sen's son) and Dr Wang Chung-hui (now minister of foreign affairs) consulted with me about wiring Marshal Yen Hsi-shan (pacification commissioner of Shansi and Suiyuan) to act as mediator to secure the release of the generalissimo. We decided to ask the party and government leaders to sign a joint telegram to Yen Hsi-shan to this effect. This was done.

Barr arrived from Hankow, and I discussed with him the possibility of Chang Hsueh-liang's flying off with the generalissimo. As I had already flown over the far western regions and knew the peculiarly difficult topographical characteristics and the absence of fields, and as I knew that landing fields

where government troops were stationed would be avoided, I felt that the objective would be somewhere behind the Red lines, probably Sinkiang.

I asked Barr if the Boeing, fully loaded, could carry enough gas to get to some point in Sinkiang and if ever Chang Hsueh-liang had talked of flying to anywhere in Sinkiang.

"Yes," was his reply to both questions, and he and I studied maps of the region, trying to locate likely localities to which Han-ching might take the generalissimo should flight be necessitated by circumstances.

I told him that if Chang Hsueh-liang did fly off I proposed to follow, and I wanted to know what plane could carry sufficient gas to get us anywhere the Boeing could go, fully loaded, as it would be, and back again without refuelling.

"If we take a Douglas, with you as the only passenger, we can carry sufficient extra gas in the cabin," he replied.

I asked him to stand by and await developments should I be unable to prevent an attack being made upon Sian city.

On Saturday, December 19, one week after the generalissimo was detained, I wired Mr Donald that T. V. was starting, but I had to wire later that he had been prevented, though an hour after that I again wired that he would be able to proceed. He had outmanœuvred official objection by stating that

he was going as a private citizen. We argued that if the government felt that it was demeaning to negotiate direct with the mutineers the least they could do was to allow us to see what we could do to influence them. The government, through newspapers, insisted that T. V. was going in a purely private capacity.

On the morning of December 20 every nerve in my body was strained to have fighting suspended for another three days and to leave with my brother, T. V., for Sian. At the last moment high officials came to the house and insisted that I should at least wait a little longer before going. The argument that restrained me from forcibly joining him was that I, by remaining in Nanking, could make certain that during his presence in Sian there would be no attack on the city. Hence I finally compromised with them that if at the end of three days T. V. did not return to Nanking no more obstacles would be placed in the way of my flying to Sian. To top it all I received a wire from Han-ching telling me that if fighting was not stopped I was not to think of going to Sian, as he could not provide protection.

On the following morning I received two wires from T. V., from Sian, one that the generalissimo was all right and the other that Mr Donald would leave for Nanking that day.

Mr Donald, however, did not reach Nanking, but from Loyang he telephoned that he had had a forced

landing alongside the Yellow River and would arrive in Nanking on Monday, December 21. I also had a wire from T. V. that he, too, would return to Nanking on that day.

Both arrived in different planes during the Monday afternoon, and after hearing their accounts of things at Sian I insisted on returning with them the next morning.

It was interesting to me to hear from Mr Donald that Han-ching had definite plans to fly out with the generalissimo in the event of an attack. I felt then that I understood Han-ching's mentality, and that gave me more confidence, not only in my intuition, but also in my belief that I could reason with him when I had the opportunity to talk with him. The situation at Sian was, I reflected, that Mr Donald had laid the foundations, T. V. had built the walls, and it would be I who would have to put on the roof.

As General Chiang Ting-wen had already been in and out of Sian, I requested him to accompany me in case the generalissimo needed an officer of his standing as representative.

General Chiang Ting-wen's wife, who regarded him as one who had been snatched from the grave, made objections to his returning there. At the airfield next morning I pointed out to her that I was not asking him to do something that I would not do myself, and I, being a woman, had much more at

stake than he. "He is a military man," I explained, "and his life belongs to the country. You, as a wife of a high military officer, should prove worthy of him by putting no obstacles in his way."

With deep emotion she silently assented. Mme Kung put her arms around her and gently drew her away as we entered the plane. People think I am brave, but I know I am not exceptional, for I am certain millions of other Chinese women would act as I did, as evinced by this woman's ability to place national interests above the safety of her husband when she realized from my explanation the nature of the situation.

Despite the predictions of disaster which were freely forecasted for me and my own knowledge of the character of the troops that controlled the city I set off with calm determination, with my eyes wide open, but unafraid. No one could know better than I the risk I would be running when the time came for me to step from my airplane into a region held by mutinous troops.

The sun was shining throughout the flight to Loyang—the first sunshine that had appeared for a week—but the Loyang field, filled with bombers fully loaded for action, did not look very reassuring to me. I spent the lunch hour talking with the officials in charge of the air force and the garrison.

As I boarded the plane I took the precaution to

impress upon the officer in command of the Loyang air force that no planes were to approach Sian till ordered to do so by the generalissimo.

Now I began to feel anxious and apprehensive. We were following the railway line through snow-covered mountains, past the peaks of the famous sacred mountain of Hwashan, which looked like great masses of sparkling ice, and finally over the opening valley leading to Sian.

"There's Lintung, where the generalissimo was captured," said Mr Donald, pointing to a square walled city nestling under the white hills.

My thoughts flew fast and furiously. In a moment, or so it seemed, we were circling over Sian and the airfield, but before the plane landed I made Mr Donald promise, handing him a revolver, that if troops got out of control and seized me he should without hesitation shoot me.

I had been pondering the attitude I should take when I came face to face with those responsible for the detention of my husband. I knew that everything depended upon my method of approach. I determined that even if they were rude I should not lose my temper but talk to them as man to man and be as natural as I could.

As the plane circled over the airfield no cars were visible. No people, except a few guards, were on the field, which showed that the telegrams announcing our departure had not been received. We therefore

went back over the city to draw attention to the fact that we had arrived, and cars were soon at the landing place.

When the plane came to a standstill Han-ching came on board, looking very tired, very embarrassed and somewhat ashamed.

I greeted him as I always have done, and as we left the plane asked him quite casually not to let any of his men search my baggage, as I disliked having my things messed up.

"Oh, madame, I would never dare do that," he very apologetically replied.

Just then Yang Hu-chen (pacification commissioner at Sian) an associate of Han-ching in the mutiny, came up. I shook hands with him as though I were just arriving on a casual visit. Yang was obviously very nervous and just as obviously very relieved at my calm attitude.

The car journey into the city was not as strained as it might have been, and as we reached the house of Han-ching he asked me if I wanted to go immediately to see the generalissimo.

I told him that I would first have some tea, wishing to show him that I took him to be a gentleman and was quite prepared to place myself in their hands. I reflected at this juncture upon the fact that certain people in Nanking had warned me that if I got to Sian I would not be allowed even to see the generalissimo but would be subjected to indigni-

ties and held as a hostage. I must confess that, while I felt sure of Han-ching, I had some misgivings about others.

The generalissimo had not yet been informed of my arrival, and I decided, in order to avoid giving him undue anxiety, to keep that fact from him until I saw him myself. The compound of the bungalow where the generalissimo was detained, just a stone's throw from Han-ching's house, was strongly guarded, some of the guards having machine guns.

As I walked into my husband's room he exclaimed: "Why have you come? You have walked into a tiger's lair." He shook his head sadly, and tears sprang to his eyes.

"I have come to see you," I said, trying to be as natural as I could. I felt it advisable to remove whatever tension I could from the situation.

My husband was in bed, suffering from a wrenched back. He looked wan and ill. I promptly saw that I would have to nurse him to secure some comfort for him. As I saw him lying there injured and helpless, the shadow of his former self, with his hands, legs and feet cut by brambles and bruised by the rocks he clambered over when scrambling about the mountain, I felt surge through me an uncontrollable wave of resentment against those responsible for his plight.

"Although I urged you not to come in any circumstances to Sian," he said, "still I felt that I could

not prevent it. I opened the Bible this morning, and my eyes lit on the words: 'Jehovah will now do a new thing, and that is, He will make a woman protect a man.' ”⁴

He told me of his trials, of his determination not to agree to anything while under restraint; and he entreated me not to ask him to sign anything while under duress.

I told him that I considered the welfare of the country above his personal welfare and that he need have no fear that I would try to influence him to sign anything.

He said several times that he was ready to die for the good of the country. I pointed out that since his detention the whole of the people of China, even those who criticized his policies, were profoundly affected, and people throughout the whole world were praying for his release. Even the smallest school children were crying as though they had lost a father, and when it was reported that he had been assassinated many soldiers had committed suicide.

“Therefore,” I urged, “you should not talk of sacrificing your life for the good of the country. To save the country there is more reason than ever for you to live. Be comforted, for God is with us. I am here to share your fate and to die with you, if God so wills it, and, if He wills it otherwise, to live and work with you for the sake of the nation.”

⁴This is the literal translation of the words in the Chinese Bible.

I explained that I sensed that the people who were detaining him were conscious of their wrongdoing, and, if rightly handled, adjustment could be quickly made. Meanwhile we should not lose our tempers but should be patient.

I noticed that his recital of what he had suffered on the morning of December 12 upset him emotionally and agitated his mind. To calm him I opened the Psalms and read to him until he drifted off to quiet sleep.

Here I was in Sian once again—Sian, the cradle of the Chinese race! I caught myself wondering if it would also be its coffin. If the generalissimo were prevented from leaving it alive the nation would be sorely riven, and incalculable disaster would come upon it. If he could go out the nation would be more solidified than ever, and from near-disaster would come great blessings. Out of evil cometh good, sung in my mind, and I believed it.

Yet if wisdom did not prevail Sian would be a deathtrap truly. Hemmed in we were, with troops waiting orders from their masters. Beyond them were the Red hordes, which the generalissimo had been fighting for years. All were waiting, expectant and impatient. And beyond the borders of China others waited and watched.

Why was I fighting to prevent an attack on Sian being launched? Not primarily to save the life of my husband, but because I foresaw the range of calam-

ity that could come upon China as the result of any impulsive use of force.

There were the armies of the Northwest, formidable in numbers and well equipped, which would naturally respond to any attack by promptly joining forces with the Red armies behind them.

Immediately such a junction took place the Reds would be revitalized, and the whole combination would be galvanized into action which would probably lead to an unprecedented civil war with an unpredictable end.

Such a condition could easily result in ruthless intervention by a Power which has long been seeking such an excuse to justify large-scale invasion to secure the complete dominance of our country.

The nightmare was ever in my mind from the moment I realized the determination of military officers to attack Sian.

I sent for Han-ching. Probably he was relieved because I did not upbraid him, but whatever it was I was able immediately to talk quietly and sincerely to him. I endeavoured to show him that he and his associates were labouring under a delusion if they thought the people of the country were with them. I told him that he had made a bad mess of things and now the question was, how was he going to get out of it? "If you had asked me," I said, "I could have told you that you could not get the generalissimo to do anything by using force."

"But this would never have happened at all had you been here, madame," he surprised me by saying. "We did wrong in seizing the generalissimo, but we tried to do something which we thought was for the good of the country. But the generalissimo would not discuss things with us. He was so angry after we detained him that he would not talk at all. Please, you try to make the generalissimo less angry and tell him we really do not want anything, not even for him to sign anything. We do not want money, nor do we want territory."

I told him that I believed him, because if he did want material things he would be no better than the old-time militarists. However, he had to prove that to the rest of the world by immediately effecting the generalissimo's release without obliging him to make any commitments. I explained to him that he was too impatient and impulsive and that many things could not be secured by taking drastic action. Progress was attained only by uniform and slow methods. In other words the whole nation had to be brought up to the proper level in order to appreciate and accept radical changes, and even then results would be slow and seemingly poor. I pointed out that I had often spent one hundred per cent of effort to get one per cent of result. China could not be changed by spectacular actions; that could only be done by painstaking and slow and steady work.

"Madame," he repeated, "I know I have done

wrong, and I am not trying to justify myself or this action. The motive was good, and it would never have happened if you had been here with the generalissimo as you usually are. I tried again and again to speak to the generalissimo, but each time he shut me up and scolded me violently."

"You do not understand the generalissimo," I said. "The generalissimo only scolds people of whom he has hopes. If he thinks people are useless he just dismisses them—he won't take the trouble to scold them. You always told the generalissimo that you looked upon him as a father, and he took you at your word."

"You know I have always had great faith in you," Han-ching said, "and my associates all admire you. When they went through the generalissimo's papers after he was detained they found two letters from you to the generalissimo which caused them to hold you in even greater respect. They saw by those letters that you were heart and soul with the people, and therefore they know, as I know, that you can adjust this situation so far as the generalissimo is concerned so that he can quickly leave Sian. We wish him to leave safely and well because we do not wish in any way to interfere with the generalissimo's work or welfare, since he is our leader and we wish to follow him. If he will only let us explain our ideas everything will be satisfactory, and that you can get him to do."

I asked him what he meant when he mentioned two letters from me to the generalissimo, and he explained that one was the suggestion referring to the raising of funds for the defence at Suiyuan. "In the other letter," he said, "you said something to the generalissimo about your joint work for China, that you felt that you both had fallen far short of your duty and that the nation should have made greater progress. And you said that in order to be worthy of the confidence the people placed in you both of you should strive more to fulfil the vows you made on your wedding day to work for the people. These words moved us," he added, "especially when you wrote that it was by God's grace that more mistakes were not made than had been made and that you felt you should pray more for divine guidance."

I took this opportunity to impress upon Hanching that if he really wanted to do something worth while for China he, too, must seek spiritual guidance on all occasions. I pointed out to him that his actions not only violated every law of decency and order, but as a responsible military man they put him beyond the pale. Worse than that, they struck at the very foundation of the national unity that it had taken so long to achieve and which had just now materialized to the credit of China and to her lasting good. I reminded him of a conversation I had with him soon after his return from Europe, recovered in health, when I pointed out that great vitality, un-

less directed along right channels, would be dangerous for any man and advised him to consider deeply every future step he contemplated taking.

As to not wanting to harm the generalissimo, I pointed out, although he had said they meant no harm to the generalissimo he must remember that on the morning of December 12, when the shooting started, the generalissimo, thinly clad, was exposed to the rigorous cold of a snow-covered mountain for several hours while bullets whizzed on every side. And that it was only by the mercy of Divine Providence that he did not die from the bullets of the machine guns or from pneumonia.

"But let us not talk about that," I continued. "The thing to discuss is how to bring this incident to a rapid conclusion, for every hour the generalissimo is detained, the harder it will be for us to restore normal conditions. Tell me, how shall we go about this?"

Han-ching nodded his head several times during my talk and replied that as far as he was concerned he would be willing to release the generalissimo immediately. Others were implicated in the affair, he explained, and he could not make a decision without getting their consent.

"Well, then you had better go and talk to them and tell them what I've just said," I urged, "and if any of them want to see the generalissimo I will see them for him, or if they want to see me, or if you

think I can influence any of them, just send them here, and I'll see them. I will wait up for your reply." Now it was late at night.

I waited until eleven o'clock. As he still had not returned, I sent a telephone message to enquire of his whereabouts. I was told that he was at a meeting. I gave instructions that after the meeting he should come to see me.

By two o'clock in the morning he still had not appeared, and I telephoned again. A few minutes later he came, looking terribly harassed and heavy eyed. He explained that as the meeting ended so late, he thought I had already retired and did not want to disturb me.

"What did they say?"

"Yang and his men are not willing to release the generalissimo," he answered. "They say that since T. V. and Madame are friendly towards me, my head would be safe, but what about theirs? They now blame me for getting them into this affair and say that since none of our conditions are granted they would be in a worse fix than ever if they now released the generalissimo. There will be another meeting tomorrow."

I saw that he was worn out and that nothing could be gained by prolonging the conversation. I said, "It is already nearly three o'clock. We'll talk this over tomorrow. You'd better get some rest."

These were days of increasing anxiety. The new element of doubt injected by the attitude of suspicious officers who might at any moment seize all of us in an effort to make certain of their own safeguards produced tense nervousness all about us. Subdued excitement charged the whole atmosphere. No one knew what might happen at any moment, the armed guards posted in the house being affected by it as much as we were. As T. V. and I moved from room to room in conference with this man or that their eyes always held unspoken questions.

The only relief we had was that we could get out into the snow-covered compound and walk round and round the cleared paths. At various points inside the grounds sentries, armed with sub-machine guns, were posted day and night to prevent anyone's getting in, but outside the walls more were posted to prevent the generalissimo from getting out. Overhead from a serene blue sky the bright sun shone, and that was the brightest thing about the whole situation at this time. The watchful guards were puzzled as we circled, and wondered why we laughed. They did not know that we had to force ourselves to do so to remove the tension. We did not want our sense of humour to atrophy or our risible faculties to become paralyzed.

During this time T. V. was kept incessantly occupied with conferences with this group of officers or that. He seemed to be involved in a perpetual mo-

tion contest of defeating one set of "final" arguments and requirements to be immediately confronted with a dozen others just as "final" and just as impracticable. From the point of view of the Sian militarists it was all a matter of averting punishment for what had been done.

Truly enough our arrival split the camp. Chang Hsueh-liang was held suspect from the moment Mr Donald arrived, but when after my talks with him he more strongly asserted his views in favour of allowing the generalissimo to leave as soon as possible he was then classed as "one of us", and the danger was constant that he and the rest of us would be arrested. That is why arrangements that were made by the leaders at one conference were upset at the next through the influence of some questioning person encountered in between times. There seemed to be no end to suspicion and doubt.

"It is because the government troops are coming closer and closer," I told the generalissimo. But he was not of so much help just then; he was so tired of the shilly-shallying, the impossible arguments and the general atmosphere of suspicion that he did not care whether he left Sian or not. "I'll refuse to go," he exploded at one time, "if this kind of thing continues."

I realized more than ever that patience and control of temper were of paramount importance and that every effort should be made to secure the confi-

dence of the recalcitrant leaders in the sincerity of our promises that if they repented the generalissimo would recommend that they should not be punished and that civil war would not be pursued to suppress them.

We heard nothing of menaces from the Reds during all this time. Quite contrary to outside beliefs, we were told, they were not interested in detaining the generalissimo. Instead they preferred his quick release. But we never forgot that their armies were out in the distance—silent now, but menacing and dangerous. We were assured that they had given up their old policies and practices. We refused to believe it. It is a ruse, we told ourselves, and we indicated to the Sian leaders that we would not swallow ruses. But, we insisted, if the Reds had at last really seen the error of their ways they could easily prove it.

All day long I kept going in and out of the room to keep the generalissimo informed of every new development. At one of these recitals my amah silently motioned me to go to the next room.

"Madame," she whispered in my ear, "please, you be careful what you say; the guards outside had their ears glued to the door." She concluded triumphantly: "But I stopped them."

"How?" I enquired.

"I just stared at them very hard and told them that they must be listening to something very inter-

esting that I also would like to hear. And I stood there till they went away."

Every effort was being made by Han-ching to break down the doubts of his associates. He brought to me one man said to have influence with them. I spent two hours discussing the whole situation with him, but much of the time he did the talking. He went into the whole problem of the Northwest to illustrate the grievances which led to the detention of the generalissimo.

When he did start to talk I let him go on without interruption. He seemed to find great relief in letting off steam and to be thoroughly in earnest in what he said. It interested me to hear him reiterate again and again that apart from the generalissimo there was no one capable of being the leader of the country at this period of its existence. When he referred to the grievance concerning the defence of the country he said, "We do not say that the generalissimo does not resist aggression, but we say he does not resist definitely enough or sufficiently fast."

I very gently pointed out to him that youth is always impatient; that because China is such an ancient country, covers such a large area of territory, with such a vast population, he who would lead the country successfully must be wisely slow, rather than spectacularly rash in what he did. Above all he must not be too far ahead of the mass of the people in carrying out his ideas. I emphasized that the eco-

conomic question was all important and must be considered in relation to national defence and that if they really had faith in the generalissimo as the only leader they should abide by his policies. Otherwise there would be confusion, if not chaos, and certainly great losses.

There were various roads leading to the same objective, I emphasized, but it was no good trying one road and then another haphazardly and irresponsibly, for by doing that we would never get anywhere. Once having faith in the sincerity and ability of the leader to achieve the ultimate goal, there was only one thing to do, and that was to follow him loyally. The man mentioned that the mutiny was the result of accident. That caused me to ask: If those responsible could not stage a simple coup bloodlessly, how could they expect to dictate national policy, to say nothing of running the country? He reiterated that they had the fullest respect for the generalissimo, but the generalissimo would not let them talk to him on questions of policy.

The result of my conversation was that he promised to use his influence with Yang to secure the release of the generalissimo as soon as possible, and he left, asking to see me again.

When I saw him the following day I urged him to use his influence to convince various parties of the futility of opposing the government, reminding him that nothing had been gained by any armed anti-

government forces during the past ten years. If they wanted to do something for the people instead of causing them continuous suffering, then they should work with and under the government. As we were all Chinese, we should not fight each other. Internal problems should be solved by political means and not by military force. That had been the policy of the generalissimo and was so even in the case of the Communists. How often had he ordered airplanes to drop leaflets telling the Communists that if they would repent and behave like law-abiding citizens they would be forgiven and could do China material good? Wherever the Communists had been the people had not benefited; nor had the Communists, since they had become outlaws and had cost the country enormous wealth that should have been used in national development and defence. The greatest service leaders of such movements could render to China, particularly at this time of national crisis, was to abandon their impracticable policies and co-operate fully in national rehabilitation under the government.

Christmas Eve was filled with beliefs and dashed hopes. I told Han-ching that he should get the generalissimo out on Christmas Day, that the truce was up on that day, and if an attack were launched we would surely be killed and he with us. Apart from that it would, as Dr Kung had said in Nanking, be "a splendid Christmas gift to the nation."

Han-ching looked baffled and bewildered but promised to try his best to fulfil my hopes. He explained that he had practically no troops in the city and that Yang's soldiers held the gates.

"We might have to fight," he said, "and that will be very dangerous for you. I can smuggle the generalissimo out. You and Donald fly off to Loyang. I'll have the generalissimo disguised, get him out of the city by car, take him to where my troops are in barracks and from there drive him by car to Loyang to meet you." He talked this plan of a last resort over with T. V., who thought it should be tried if everything else failed.

I refused, not only because the generalissimo could not stand the car journey, his back having been injured, but because it was not the manner in which he should leave. "He will not be disguised," I said, "and if he cannot go openly by airplane, then I will stay with him, and if he is to die because of attacks on the city by the government forces, then I will die with him." I could see that T. V. and Han-ching thought I was just as obstinate as the generalissimo had proved to be when he refused to relent in his attitude, but I was determined not to compromise.

"It is imperative that you persuade them that the generalissimo must be freed at once," I said to Han-ching as he went out. "The whole of China demands it, and so does the whole world. Chinese everywhere

are sending cablegram after cablegram demanding the generalissimo's freedom and denouncing you as a traitor and worse."

"I know it," said Han-ching. "They have sent the wires to me. However, they do not understand that I mean no harm to the generalissimo in any way."

The pressure now being exerted by T. V. and Han-ching on the others was making for increased suppressed excitement.

We ourselves were wondering what Christmas Day would bring us. It did not look too hopeful. I kept reminding them that the truce was approaching its end, and, knowing the temper and the viewpoints of those at Nanking who had command, I was sure that an attack under full pressure would be launched and calamity descend upon everyone and everything.

It was all a question, with the Sian leaders, of saving heads. I assured the suspicious ones that if they really repented their heads would be safe, but if they did not repent no one could say what would happen. They knew the generalissimo was magnanimous, and they would have to depend upon his magnanimity.

Han-ching began to lose patience with them and threatened them that if they did not "finish with politics" he would act "as he saw fit."

But no question of money or increased power or position was at any time brought up. Indeed that

aspect of the usual bargaining by recalcitrant military leaders was entirely absent from this mutiny. That is why it was different from others; why it showed an improvement in political development and provides the hope that it will be the last attempt at mutiny.

In reality all the political reforms the Sian leaders espoused had long been in the mind of the generalissimo himself, as they themselves saw from his diary and private papers. True to his nature, however, he kept what was in his mind to himself and was perhaps too intolerant of others when they endeavoured to express views to him, especially if those others (as in this case) were subordinates who, he thought, were not performing their duties according to orders. Being a rigid disciplinarian, he resented any departure from fundamental military requirements by officers. "Theirs but to do and die, theirs not to reason why" was what he expected of his subordinates on the battlefield.

So close to his heart is the well-being of the people, nevertheless, that he always looked for better political representation for them and strove to shape political trends to that end. In all his anti-Communist campaigns he has invited the Communists to surrender. Many did, and they and their fellows who were captured were placed in congenial concentration centres, and there were properly clothed, fed and educated to understand the changes

in administration that had been instituted for the amelioration of the conditions of the masses.

That spirit was the cause of the foundation of the New Life Movement and of what is now the enormously successful Rural Welfare work which began in Kiangsi Province. The generalissimo saw that the way to prevent Communistic teachings taking root was to beat the Communists at their own game—to institute better administration and give the people in the former Communist areas and elsewhere the chance to improve their conditions of life in all respects.

Kiangsi Province is where the Communists first tried to establish themselves. The region where they operated was devastated, and millions of people were demoralized or entirely bereft of homes and holdings. To rehabilitate them and give them something to live for was the problem that confronted the generalissimo as soon as the Communists were driven out. He solved it by setting up centres to help them help themselves. This was done with the co-operation of missionaries, by founding the Kiangsi Christian Rural Service Union. The New Life Movement was started by the generalissimo to give the people a spiritual life line to hold on to, and it taught them, among other essential things, home hygiene, self-help, co-operative service and the requirements of good citizenship. It has now spread all over China.

As the sun went down on Christmas Eve there was more dejection than hope apparent, but talk and more talk went on far into the night.

And then came the dawn of Christmas Day. The generalissimo and I have always had a game on such festive occasions: the one who gives the first greeting shall determine the programme of the day. He won. Just after daylight appeared came "Merry Christmas" from the depths of his bedclothes. It seemed to me a dismal outlook on that cold dawn, but I responded cheerily enough without specially feeling it.

"Merry Christmas to you," I said, missing the Christmas tree and realizing that in this predicament and in this place there could be no such thing as a Christmas tree and that Santa Claus would surely pass by Sian. These lugubrious thoughts had hardly flashed through my weary and sleepy mind when the door opened, and in paraded two servants. Each held in his hands what looked like a gargantuan stocking stretched taut by a weight. They were stockings truly enough—golf stockings, one having tied to its foot a portable typewriter and a cheerful Christmas greeting for me, while at the end of the other stocking was suspended a warm steamer rug and greetings for the generalissimo, his own having been lost with his other possessions in the mutiny. So after all Santa Claus did come to Sian, and he lived under the same roof! He was a friend of my



Scene—P. & A. Photo

At the opening of the People's National Convention in 1931. At the left: Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang; center: Panchen Lama, the "living Buddha"; right: General Chiang Kai-shek.

father; he is a friend of ours, and his intimates call him "Gran" or "Don."

The generalissimo threw back his head and laughed, saying: "That's just like the old gentleman." It was the first time I had heard him laugh in Sian.

So some cheer and some hope came to us with the Christmas sunlight, but throughout the whole morning the doubts remained. The recalcitrants wanted signed orders from the generalissimo before they were willing to let him go. And the generalissimo would not sign anything. Nor would he talk. But to keep up my own courage and to give a good imitation of someone doing something with the determination to go somewhere, I began to pack.

We hoped that we would be able to leave Sian to reach Nanking before sunset. We should leave by eleven-thirty A.M. in order to do that, but ten o'clock came with no result. And ten-thirty came.

"The plane is ready," said Han-ching, "but nothing is settled." Eleven o'clock came. Our hopes were dashed, but we did not give up.

"We can go to Loyang and stay there the night," said someone.

"Yes," I responded eagerly, "don't let's give up hope. If we pray hard enough I am sure our prayers will be answered somehow."

Everyone seemed to be running about in confusion. T. V. went off to the city to see Yang; others

went "hither and yon", pulling this string and that. Came one o'clock. "Tiffin's ready," announced someone. Hopes further crashed, but we ate—and, with food, optimism reasserted itself.

"If we get away by four o'clock we can make Loyang by dark," someone stated, and we made four o'clock the zero hour.

A coolie, carrying a suitcase, followed by Chang Hsueh-liang, was seen crossing our courtyard shortly after two o'clock. Much interest was visible among the guards. There was no report from the city, where T. V. and others were endeavouring to allay the fears of those who grew afraid of reprisals if the generalissimo were released without definite undertakings in writing or, by the issuance of desired orders, ensuring their immunity from punishment.

Telephones were incessantly going, and there was continuous talking. T. V. suddenly came through the gates. From him we learned that those in command of the city had agreed that we could leave.

"But why leave so late?" asked Han-ching. "Would it not be better to wait till the morning and go direct to Nanking?"

"Wait!" I cried. "The quicker we clear out of here, the better. Wait till these people change their minds again! Give them another night in which to vacillate, to develop more fears, perhaps to run

amok—and this is Christmas Day! No indeed! We leave while leaving's good."

Han-ching said that although Yang agreed that we could leave some of his subordinates might start trouble if they got wind of it. Therefore we should make our departure as unostentatious as possible and not even take my amah.

"What," I exclaimed. "Leave her to the mercy of mutinous troops! I do not know what would happen to her after we leave."

"She will be quite all right," he assured me.

"No, I have not the heart to let her run any risk when she has been so faithful. When I left Nanking I explained to her the dangers we were running into and told her that if she had the least fear she need not come with me, and she replied that she would go wherever I go." I solved the difficulty by putting her in charge of Colonel J. L. Huang, and everybody was satisfied.

When I told the generalissimo we could then leave he decided that he should speak to Han-ching and Yang Hu-chen together before he concluded his fortnight's stay with them. So Yang had to be called.

While we were waiting the generalissimo was told that Chang Hsueh-liang was determined to go to Nanking with him.

The generalissimo remonstrated; told him that there was no necessity for him to do so; that he

should stay with his troops; that—in any case, he ordered him to stay.

Han-ching explained that he was under obligation to go to Nanking. First, he had undertaken with his associates to take full responsibility for what had happened; and, second, it was his duty to show that what had been done was not with mutinous intent nor against the generalissimo, his position or power.

Realizing that this request had in it new elements, when compared with former mutinies or rebellions, and constituted a new phase in Chinese political development, the generalissimo withdrew his objection. He saw that the unusual request would set a precedent that any others, who might in the future contemplate using force to secure personal or political adjustments, would have seriously to consider.

I wish specially to point out that this is the first time on record that any high officer responsible for mutinous conduct had shown eagerness to proceed to the capital to be tried for his misdeeds. This explains why the Central government was lenient to Han-ching, a fact which many foreigners could not understand.

The excitement was even more intensified when General Yang, with some bodyguards, came to the house. He and Han-ching went straight to the generalissimo's room. They stood at rigid attention despite the generalissimo's invitation to them to sit

down, and they only did so when I finally told them that it would be easier for the generalissimo to talk to them if they were to sit down, since he was compelled to lie down.

When the generalissimo began to speak to them I decided to take notes of what he said.⁵ He was gentle and earnest with them; they were visibly moved.

It was now getting late, and we made haste to leave. The generalissimo and I rode in a car with Han-ching, who sat with the chauffeur in spite of the generalissimo's invitation to sit with us in the back, while T. V. and Mr Donald were in another car with General Yang.

At the airfield the cars drove close to the door of Han-ching's airplane, in which we were to leave, and we stood not upon the order of our going. The motors were already warmed up, there was a roar from the engines, and we were off. I heaved a sigh of relief for the first time in two weeks. Gladly enough I bade farewell to Sian. "Quoth the Raven, 'Nevermore.' "

⁵The generalissimo's remarks appear as an appendix to his diary, beginning on page 177.

A FORTNIGHT IN SIAN: EXTRACTS FROM A DIARY

By Chiang Kai-shek

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

THE SIAN REBELLION of December 12 last year broke out suddenly. The Central government was much shocked, and our very national existence was threatened. It may be recalled that before my second visit to Shensi I perceived that perverse ideas had already entered the mind of the Northeastern troops¹ and that their conduct was rather wayward. Reports of a startling nature such as that the troops were in collusion with the bandits² and that they had retreated from the front without orders repeatedly came to me. Some even went so far as to say that the troops were secretly plotting a rebellion.

My opinion was that the foundation for national

¹The army of Chang Hsueh-liang formerly stationed in the Northeastern provinces (Manchuria), which was transferred to North China about one year before the Mukden Incident which led to the occupation of Manchuria by Japan.

²Communists.

unity had already been laid, that the Northeastern troops, under conditions created by our national crisis, might have given occasion for the expression of unorthodox views, but that if they were given sound and earnest advice they would realize the importance of our national interests, and all as one man would submit to authority. We are all descendants of Hwang Ti.³ Only those who fail to understand our national policy would start subversive movements. Being their chief commander, I was responsible for their training and their discipline. My devotion to the party and the country made me disregard my own personal safety.

For these reasons I proceeded to Tungkwan from Loyang on December 4. There I sent for the commanders of the bandit suppression troops in Shensi and Kansu and received them one by one on a number of successive days. I enquired about the conditions at the front and gave them my orders. I told them that the bandit suppression campaign had been prosecuted to such a stage that it would require only the efforts of "the last five minutes" to achieve the final success. I urged them to perform their duty with courage and determination. I also called them to conferences at which we discussed questions of strategy, and I explained to them my views. Judging them with an unprejudiced mind, I found that the commanders of the Northeastern

³Hwang Ti is universally considered the ancestor of all Chinese.

troops were loyal to the country and fully understood the principle of righteousness. I had not the slightest suspicion of their treachery. Unexpectedly a mutiny broke out, almost under the tip of my nose, and threatened my personal safety. As I had full confidence in them, I neglected to take precautions. For this I should blame myself and not others.

The Sian rebellion has proved a great hindrance to the progress of the work of our national revolution. The results which had been achieved during the past eight years and which would have been crowned with final success in a couple of weeks, or at most a month, were almost completely ruined. Inestimable damage has been done to national defence, to communications and to the economic reconstruction work in the Northwest. Thus several years efforts of the government and the people, already taking shape, were retarded. It is impossible to restore in a short space of time local peace and order and reinstate a sense of security on the money market. Generally speaking, our national progress has reverted to a condition that prevailed three years ago. It is indeed deplorable. If the rebels have any conscience someday they will realize that their unwarranted action should not be forgiven.

Since my return to Nanking Chinese and foreigners have frequently approached me for particulars of my personal experience in the Sian rebellion. As I am a responsible member of the party and the

government, I should not have allowed myself to be trapped in a city full of rebels. I am ashamed of my shortcomings and have no wish to appear to justify myself. Even if I give a plain statement of facts, still I am afraid that something may slip my memory. Moreover people may suspect that I have exaggerated my own merits and the wickedness of others. Although the rebels did not treat me as their chief I cannot deny that they are my subordinates, and therefore I accept full responsibility for the outrages committed by them. In telling the story I place the blame squarely on my own shoulders. Since my friends and comrades are eager for detailed information concerning this incident I hereby, instead of frequently repeating the story, extract from my diary the main facts concerning my personal experience and the thoughts that were in my mind during those troublous days. This, I fear, may reveal my lack of ability as a statesman and as a military commander.

February, the 26th Year of the Republic.

EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARY

December 11. This morning while I was walking in the compound I noticed two men on the Lishan Mountain, standing looking at me for about ten

minutes. The incident struck me as singular. As I returned to my quarters I noticed many military trucks proceeding east on the Sian-Lintung highway. Being my office hour, I entered my office and paid no attention to the matter. Li Tien-tsai (head of Intelligence work under Chang Hsueh-liang) suddenly called and requested an interview. As he had made no appointment, I was rather surprised at his unexpected call. During the interview Li expressed his doubt as to the wisdom of the bandit suppression policy. His views were the same as those of Han-ching (Chang Hsueh-liang), which were expressed to me the day before. Finding that his mind had been very much poisoned, I reprimanded him severely.

Tonight, among others, I invited Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-chen and Yu Hsueh-chung to my headquarters to dine with me and discuss plans for bandit suppression. Yang and Yu did not come. On enquiry Han-ching informed me that he was one of the hosts at a dinner given that night at Sian in honour of the high civil and military officials of the Central government who were on a visit to Sian, that Yang and Yu were at Sian to entertain the guests and that after the dinner here he would accompany my other guests to Sian. I was rather surprised at Han-ching's uneasy manner and the apparent distraction of his mind and thought that

he might have been displeased at my reprimand on the previous day or that he had heard that Li Tien-tsai had been rebuked by me. I thought this over when I was going to bed but could not find an explanation. I then dismissed the matter from my mind.

December 12. At 5.30 A.M., when I was dressing after my exercise, I heard gun firing just in front of the gate of my headquarters. I sent one of my bodyguards to see what was the matter, but as he did not come back to report, I sent two others out and then heard gun firing again, which then continued incessantly. Thereupon I felt that the Northeastern troops had revolted. On this visit to Shensi I had only my personal bodyguards and twenty uniformed soldiers. The soldiers who had been put on guard duty outside my headquarters were Chang's bodyguards. Presently Lieutenant Mao sent a messenger to report that a mutiny had broken out and that they had already reached the second gate, but that from telephone communication with the barracks behind the mountain he learned that there was nothing untoward in evidence. I asked where Lieutenant Mao was and was told that he was at the front compound near the bridge, directing the bodyguard. The messenger said that Mao begged me first to proceed to the mountain at the back of

my quarters. I asked what the mutinous troops looked like and was told that they had on fur caps and belonged to the Northeastern troops.

Accompanied by Tso Pei-chi, one of my own guard officers, and Chiang Hsiao-chung, an A.D.C., I started for the mountain at the back of the house. After crossing the Fei Hung Bridge we found the eastern side door securely locked, and the key could nowhere be found. We then scaled the wall, which was only about ten feet high and not difficult to get over. But just outside the wall there was a deep moat, the bottom of which was about thirty feet below the top of the wall. As it was still dark, I missed my footing and fell into the moat. I felt a bad pain and was unable to rise. About three minutes later I managed to stand up and walked with difficulty. After having walked several tens of paces we reached a small temple, where some of my bodyguards were on duty. They helped me to climb the mountain.

At that time I was under the impression that the mutiny was local, that only a section of the troops at Lintung had mutinied, possibly at the instigation of the Communist bandits, and that it was not a preconceived plot planned by Han-ching. I also thought that if the whole of the Northeastern army were in revolt my headquarters would have been completely surrounded. The absence of mutinous troops outside the wall further convinced me that

the mutiny was local. I believed that if we could cross the hill and wait for daybreak the trouble would be over. On the eastern side of this hill there was no path, but we considered it was not safe to go west, as we might meet the mutinous troops on that side. So we proceeded east. There were precipitous cliffs on which we fumbled about for a hold as we climbed.

After about half an hour we reached the mountaintop and sat down on a piece of level ground for a short rest. I sent a bodyguard to a cliff before us to reconnoitre. Presently gun firing was heard on all sides. Bullets whizzed by quite close to my body. Some of the bodyguards were hit and dropped dead. I then realized that I was surrounded, that the mutiny was not local and that the whole of the Northeastern troops took part in it. So I decided not to take shelter but to go back to my headquarters and see what could be done. I walked down the mountain as quickly as I could. Halfway down the mountain I fell into a cave which was overgrown with thorny shrubs and in which there was barely enough space to admit me. I felt exhausted. Twice I struggled to my feet but fell down again. I was compelled to remain there for a rest and to wait further developments.

As the day gradually dawned I could see from the cave that the Lishan Mountain was surrounded by a large number of troops. Then I heard the det-

onation of machine guns and hand grenades near my headquarters. I knew that my faithful bodyguards at the headquarters continued their resistance and that the rebels were using artillery to attack them. It was about nine o'clock, after which time no more firing could be heard. The rebels sought for me. Twice they passed the cave in which I took cover but failed to discover me.

About twenty or thirty feet from my refuge I heard someone hotly arguing with the rebels. It was Chiang Hsiao-chung's voice. The rebels made a more thorough search. I heard one of the mutinous soldiers above the cave saying: "Here is a man in civilian dress; probably he is the generalissimo."

Another soldier said: "Let us first fire a shot."

Still another said: "Don't do that."

I then raised my voice and said: "I am the generalissimo. Don't be disrespectful. If you regard me as your prisoner, kill me, but don't subject me to indignities."

The mutineers said: "We don't dare." They fired three shots into the air and shouted: "The generalissimo is here!"

Sun Ming-chiu, a battalion commander,⁴ then approached me. He knelt before me with tears in his eyes and requested me to go down the mountain. Then I knew that the soldiers attacking the headquarters belonged to the 2nd Battalion of Chang's

⁴Battalion commander of Chang Hsueh-liang's bodyguard division.

bodyguards. Sun accompanied me down the mountain. When we reached my headquarters I intended to go in for a rest. I saw through the doorway that things were in great disorder and the ground was strewn with dead bodies. Sun asked me to go by motorcar to Sian. He said that my room was already in a state of confusion and that he had received orders from his superiors to invite me to Sian. I ordered Sun to find the deputy commander (Chang Hsueh-liang), who, he said, was in Sian waiting for me. He added: "We don't dare to mutiny against our superior officers; we wish to make a personal representation that Your Excellency will kindly grant our request."

To this I shouted in anger: "Hold your tongue, you rebels! If you want to kill me, kill me right now!"

Sun and the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 105th Division saluted once again and requested me to board the car for the city. As I wanted to see Chang Hsueh-liang and find out from him what all this meant, I entered the car.

Sun Ming-chiu and the brigade commander helped me into the car. Tan Hai, the most trusted A.D.C. of Chang Hsueh-liang, sat with the chauffeur. The car went straight to Sian. When nearing Tungkwan (the East City Gate), I saw Chang's personal car, and the brigade commander told me that the deputy commander was coming. When the

car approached us Chang was not in it, but he had sent an officer who had been instructed where I was to be taken. My destination was to be the New City Building, which is the pacification commissioner's headquarters at Sian, occupied by Yang Hu-chen. A feeling of doubt arose in my mind. As I understood it was the Northeastern army which revolted and besieged my headquarters, why should I be sent to Yang's place? By that time the car reached the East Gate. I was further surprised at seeing the guards wearing armlets of the 17th Army (Yang's army). I then thought that as Yang had not attended my dinner of the previous night, he must have been detained by Chang. I also believed that the high officers of the Central government at Sian must have met with the same fate and that the armlets of the 17th Army worn by the soldiers had possibly been taken from Yang's soldiers after being disarmed by Chang's men and were used to conceal their identity. Yang is an old comrade of our party and has been in long association with the revolutionary movement. It was my strong conviction that he took no part in the revolt. We reached the New City Building at ten o'clock.

When I entered the building I did not see Yang. After a while Sung Wen-mei, commander of the Special Service Battalion of the pacification commissioner's headquarters, entered my room. To him Sun Ming-chiu handed over the guard duty. Sung

told me that Chang Hsueh-liang said he wished me to rest for a while and that he would soon come. I ordered him to send for Chang, who appeared half an hour later. He was very respectful to me, but I did not return his courtesies. Chang stood with his hands at his sides.

I asked him: "Did you know beforehand about today's revolt?"

He answered in the negative.

I continued: "If you have no previous knowledge of the affair you should see that I return immediately to Nanking or Loyang. Then it may not be difficult to settle this affair."

Chang answered: "I did not know anything of the actual developments, but I wish to lay my views before Your Excellency the generalissimo."

I retorted: "Do you still call me the generalissimo? If you still recognize me as your superior you should send me to Loyang; otherwise you are a rebel. Since I am in the hands of a rebel you had better shoot me dead. There is nothing else to say."

Chang replied: "If Your Excellency accepts my suggestions I shall obey your orders."

I rebuked him by saying: "Which are you, my subordinate or my enemy? If my subordinate, you should obey my orders. If you are my enemy you should kill me without delay. You should choose either of these two steps, but say nothing more, for I will not listen to you."

Chang then explained that in taking this action his motive was revolutionary but not mutinous.

I then shouted in indignation: "Why do you still disclaim any previous knowledge of the mutiny?"

Chang answered: "Even if we are enemies there is still the possibility for us to enter into negotiations."

I was almost overcome with anger and retorted: "Can there be any talk between enemies? What type of man do you take me to be? Can the rebels and my enemies compel me to surrender by force?"

Chang was somewhat taken aback and added: "I am not alone responsible for this affair. There are many other people who are in the movement, which should be referred to the people for their verdict. Should the people be in sympathy with this movement, then it will prove that I am representing the common will of the people, and Your Excellency will realize that my action is not wrong. Then you may retire from office and let me do the work. If the people are not in sympathy with this movement, then I shall admit my own fault, and Your Excellency may resume your work. I believe I have not in any way disobeyed your teachings. Please, don't be angry, and consider the matter carefully."

When I heard "the people's verdict" I realized that it was a malicious plot to kill me by using the mob as their excuse. I shouted: "You are crazy. Do you think that the people are in sympathy with your

mutiny? Even the so-called 'Popular Front' will not give you their support. You claim that your motives are revolutionary. Can a mutiny be called a revolution? Chen Chiung-ming⁵ also claimed to be a revolutionist, but who in the world could believe him? Since you are a rebel, how can you even expect to command the obedience of your men who surround this house? How can you be a man yourself? How can you be sure that your men will not follow your example and do as you are doing to me? Remember that four years ago the people wanted to get hold of you and punish you, but I took the blame for you I do not know how many times. Because I took a generous protective attitude towards you, you were able to go abroad. From now on, in spite of the size of the world, where will you find a place for yourself? Living, there will be no place to put your feet; dead, there will be no place to bury your bones. You still do not realize your predicament, but I do. I am really afraid for you."

On hearing this, Chang's face suddenly changed colour. He said: "Are you still so obstinate?"

I retorted: "What do you mean by 'obstinate'? I am your superior, and you are a rebel. According to military discipline and the law of the land you, as a rebel, deserve not only reprimand, but also punishment. My head may be cut off, my body may be

⁵Chen Chiung-ming (civil governor of Canton and commander-in-chief of the revolutionary army) mutinied against Dr Sun Yat-sen at Canton in 1922.

mutilated, but I must preserve the honour of the Chinese race and must uphold law and order. I am now in the hands of you rebels. If I allow the honour of the four hundred million people whom I represent to be degraded by accepting any demands in order to save my own life we should lose our national existence. Do you think that by using force you can compel me to surrender to you rebels? Today you have lethal weapons; I have none, but instead I am armed with the principles of righteousness. These are my weapons of defence. With these I must defend the honour of the people whom I represent and must be a faithful follower of our late leader (Dr Sun Yat-sen). I shall do nothing to betray the trust imposed on me by the martyrs of the revolution. I shall not bring shame and dishonour to this world, to the memory of my parents and to the nation. You, young man, do you think you can make me submissive by force? You mistake my firm stand on the principles of law and order for obstinacy. If you are a brave man, kill me; if not, confess your sins and let me go. If you do neither, you will be in a dangerous position. Why don't you kill me now?"

When he heard this he was downcast and remained silent. After a while he asked: "Why don't you give more thought to this matter? I am going."

Then I gestured with my hand and said: "Get out!"

He assumed a more respectful manner and asked

me whether I would wish to remove to his home. I answered: "I shall never enter the enemy's camp."

He then said that if I lived with him I would be safe.

I retorted: "I need none of your protection."

He then stood up and sat down several times and watched for any change of my countenance.

I closed my eyes and paid him no attention.

During the following half-hour he repeatedly said that he would go; finally he sat down again and ordered the servant to bring food to my room and asked me to eat. I said: "I have already reached the age of fifty, and since I am the cause of so much worry to the nation what face have I to eat the food won by their sweat and blood, to say nothing of touching the food provided by an enemy?"

I refused to eat. Chang stood by me for a long time. I asked him where was Mr Shao,⁶ the chairman of the Shensi provincial government.

He answered that Mr Shao was also in the headquarters of the pacification commissioner. He added that the high military officers of the Central government were all safe except Chien Ta-chun, who was wounded by a gun shot in a struggle with the mutinous soldiers. He informed me that it was merely a superficial wound near his ear.

I ordered him to send for Mr Shao. He sent a

⁶Shao Li-tzu.

guard to look for Mr Shao, but he himself remained beside me.

A few minutes later Mr Shao Li-tzu came and enquired after my health.

Chang then withdrew from my presence.

I asked Mr Shao: "Have you come from the office of the provincial government?"

Mr Shao answered, "I came from the office of the commander of the pacification commissioner's bodyguards. General Chien was also there, but he is wounded. He was shot through the chest and bled profusely. He has been removed to another place for medical attention."

Although Chang had left my room Battalion Commander Sung was still waiting at the door. Twice I told him to go away and to close the door, but Sung failed to do so. I then stood up to shut the door myself. Sung entered the room and asked me to pardon him. He said that he was ordered to wait on me and that he did not think it safe to close the door. I knew that he kept a watch over me, but I paid him no more attention.

I told Mr Shao briefly what I had said to Chang and then drew up a telegram to my wife. I handed the telegram to Battalion Commander Sung and asked him to take it to Chang for dispatch.

At that time I knew that I would be a martyr of the revolution and that I must leave my last words to my family.

When Mr Shao saw that in my heart I had definitely determined to sacrifice my life he was greatly moved.

He said: "I believe it is impossible for you to go back to Loyang, but I think Chang will have no courage to harm you. But if the case is allowed to drag on for some time I am afraid that other complications will arise. As Your Excellency's personal safety is closely bound up with the safety of the nation, it is advisable for you to take great care of yourself. I remember that in 1927 and 1931 twice you tendered your resignation, but, owing to the fact that your services were urgently needed by the party and the government, you re-entered the political arena after a short time of retirement. How does that compare with present circumstances?"

I told him that the trouble was that I trusted others too much and neglected to take necessary precautions. "For this reason," I continued, "a great injury has been done to the country. After my return to Nanking I shall tender my resignation again and ask the Central government to punish me. But I shall never resign my post in Sian under the duress of my subordinates. Even if they want me to issue an order or to grant certain conditions I will die rather than do so. If I yielded on any point for my personal safety I would forfeit the confidence placed in me by four hundred million people."

Mr Shao remained silent.

As I was thinly clad, he told me to put on more clothing.

I told him I needed no more clothing.

Battalion Commander Sung then offered me a fur-lined gown, but I refused to accept it. The attendants served breakfast and biscuits, but I told them to take the food away. I was on the point of exhaustion and lay down to sleep. Mr Shao left me after telling me to take care of my health.

After Mr Shao's departure Battalion Commander Sung entered and asked me whether I recognized him. I told him that I did not.

Sung said he was at one time a cadet of the Whampoa Military Academy.⁷ At a time only two months before his graduation he was dismissed from the academy for some unknown reason. He claimed to be my pupil. Sung waited upon me very attentively. He offered me clothes and food and gently asked me to accept them.

I then said to him: "Do you remember what I taught you when you were in the academy? A revolutionist must be a man of integrity. I cannot now sacrifice my personal integrity even to save my life. What I taught you in the academy you should adhere to. If my actions do not agree with my words, how can I be a teacher of others?" Sung retired.

Throughout this day I took no food. The attend-

⁷A military academy at Whampoa, near Canton, of which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has been the president since its inauguration. This academy approximates West Point in the United States.

ants remained awake the whole night. As late as one o'clock in the morning Sung entered my room to see me.

December 13. I got up at eight o'clock. The attendants told me that Chang had called at six o'clock. As I was asleep, he did not dare to disturb me. I then sent for Mr Shao.

A short while after, Chang came again. He paid me great respect and asked my permission to speak to me once again. I told him that I was so tired that I could not talk. He withdrew from my presence without saying a word.

Battalion Commander Sung and the servants of the headquarters served breakfast. They said they had bought the food with their own money. They did so because I was not willing to eat the food provided by the authorities there. They emphasized the fact that my personal safety was closely related to the safety of the nation.

They added: "As Your Excellency fasted the whole day yesterday, we beg you to take some food, if only for our sake. If Your Excellency does not care to eat for your personal comfort, then surely the interests of the nation must be taken into consideration."

I answered: "Thank you very much, but I am not hungry yet. When I need food I shall ask for it."

On this day I did not take any food.

The attendants served tea every hour and were very attentive to me. They showed great anxiety when they saw me take no food. Their sincerity moved me because it was a spontaneous expression of their feelings.

At eleven o'clock Shao again called. I felt a pain in my loins and in my legs, and I could scarcely sit up.

Shao sat by my bedside while Battalion Commander Sung kept watch as he did on the previous day.

I ordered Sung to retire, but he said that he had been ordered by Deputy Commander-in-Chief Chang to watch me and did not dare to withdraw from my presence without orders. He remained throughout the interview.

Mr Shao said: "Chang just called on me and told me that it was rather inconvenient for the generalissimo to stay in the pacification commissioner's headquarters. For this reason he has prepared a house for the generalissimo. It is the residence of Kao Pai-wu, commander of the 84th Division. In front of the house there is a grass lawn. The rooms are clean, with heating installation. It will be beneficial to the generalissimo's health. After the generalissimo's removal Chang will be able to call on you in the morning and evening. As your anger has not yet subsided, he dare not make such a request himself but wishes me to do so on his behalf."

After Mr Shao had finished speaking I told him I would not move to any place. As this was the Sian pacification commissioner's headquarters it was logically an organization under the Executive Yuan. Being chief of the Executive Yuan, it was appropriate for me to remain here. I added that if Chang could not send me back to Loyang, here I would die. I asked Shao to convey these words to Chang.

I also learned from Shao that Chang had told him that whenever he saw me I always severely reprimanded him. For this reason he was unable to repeat his request.

Shao advised me to be more lenient to Chang when he came to see me next time.

To this I answered: "I used to have high hopes of Chang. On former occasions he treated me as if I were his father. I could speak harsh words to him without hurting his feelings. In ordinary circumstances Chang could say anything to me, but today I will listen to his words only when he does not present any demands or conditions to me. You should try to dissuade Chang from being fooled by others. He should awake from his dream of a Sino-Russian Alliance. He should not be under the delusion that even if he fails in this coup he can still go abroad to enjoy himself. He should realize that if he commits such folly without any feelings of repentance no country or people in this world would regard him as a friend. He will lose the respect of the whole world.

“Chang is supposed to pay me respect and have confidence in me, but he should realize that if he really respects or has confidence in his leader he should do what he can to defend his leader when the latter is being unjustly attacked by others. If he fails to do so under such circumstances and remains silent or indifferent, then his respect and confidence are not genuine. He will finally take up arms against his leader, and by and by his insubordination will result in his own death. The other day Chang told me that he informed the petitioners (students) at Pachiao that he could act as their spokesman and convey their message to me. At the same time he said he could be my representative and could consider their demands. Apparently he thought his words were very eloquent. He said this to me in a triumphant manner; I instantly corrected his mistake by pointing out that he could not represent both sides. Is this the kind of respect that he pays to his leader?

“Next time you see Chang please tell him the particulars about the severance of my connections with Chen Chiung-ming. Before it was apparent to others I was conscious of Chen’s disloyalty to Dr Sun. You probably know that Dr Sun assigned me to Chen’s headquarters. At first Chen had great confidence in me, but gradually he changed his attitude and from time to time gave me all sorts of trouble. I bore his unkind treatment patiently. One day at

the officers' mess Yeh Chu made slanderous attacks on Dr Sun and nicknamed him 'Sun, the Big Gun.' Chen was not perturbed by these slanderous remarks, but I was very indignant. Laying down my chopsticks, I left the mess table and asked Chen to come to another room. I asked him whether he had heard Yeh's words and, if so, why he did not stop Yeh's slanderous attack on Dr Sun. Chen mollified my feelings with ambiguous words and completely evaded the issue.

"Knowing that he would sooner or later turn against Dr Sun, I packed my luggage and returned to my native place. When Chen openly rebelled against Dr Sun, causing him great hardships, I, after a highly adventurous journey to Whampoa, joined the late party leader on the cruiser Yung Feng. From then on we waged a bitter war against Chen and vowed not to live with him under the same sky.

"If a man has confidence in his leader he should unconditionally obey his orders and not harbour suspicion nor assume an indifferent attitude.

"Today's mutiny, started by Chang, must have some deep underlying cause. If he continues to assert that he still obeys my orders he does not understand revolutionary doctrine. His unwarranted actions are deplorable, to say nothing of his lack of sincerity and discrimination."

I then asked Shao whether he had seen Yang Hu-

chen, and I expressed surprise at Yang's absence. I asked Shao to move into the headquarters and live with me. Shao was willing to do so, but he doubted whether Chang would give his permission.

On this day Chang called on me four times. He appeared more calm and silent than before. In the evening he came into my room in military uniform. When he opened the door and saw me in bed he told the attendant not to disturb me. He went out to the great hall where there seemed to be a large number of people discussing some affairs, but their voices were inaudible. I seemed to catch the words: "To refer the case to the people for judgment."

At half-past twelve tonight Battalion Commander Sung informed me that Sun Ming-chiu wished to see me. I told him that I had already retired. Sung said that Sun insisted upon seeing me. Sun came here, I was told, to arrange for my removal. Sun entered the room armed with a pistol. He repeatedly said that I must move tonight. I pointed out to him that I would just as soon die here as anywhere else.

"I would rather die," I continued, "than leave this room. After my death you may tell the people that my grave will be in the great hall just outside this room. You enter my room armed with deadly weapons. Apparently you threaten me with force. I am unarmed, but you must know that righteousness is

on my side. If you want to kill me, kill me right now. I shall never move from this room."

Thereupon Sun became more friendly but continued his request for my removal. At two o'clock in the morning he was still there, so I became very indignant and said: "You enter my room in the dead of night carrying firearms and worry me with your unwelcome requests. Is this reasonable? I am your superior. When I order you to go you should go at once."

Sun then left my room.

I know that these rebels are very dangerous people. I am determined to fight them with moral character and spiritual strength and with the principles of righteousness. When I was young I studied the classics of our sages. After I attained manhood I devoted myself to the revolutionary cause. There are many heroic deeds in our history. The martyrs of the former ages always defied death. In the pages of our history we find vivid descriptions of the circumstances under which they met their death. Being a great admirer of these heroes, I prefer to follow in their footsteps instead of disgracing myself. The courageous life as taught by the late Dr Sun should be followed by us all. Unless we do this calamity will certainly overtake us. Jesus Christ was tempted by Satan and withstood him for forty days. He fought against evil influences more strongly than I do today. I am now, however, fighting the mutineers with

ever-increasing moral strength. I must maintain the same spirit which led Jesus Christ to the Cross, and I must be ready to meet any death which the mutineers may bring upon me by the so-called "people's judgment." This will justify the teachings I have received from my mother and will fulfil the expectations of my comrades.

At this moment, examining my own mind, I find it clear and calm. My mental comfort is that I shall be able to carry out my lifelong conviction.

December 14. Chang came to see me again in the morning, standing behind the door, with tears in his eyes, as if he regretted very much what he had done. I did not speak to him. After a while he left without a word. I told the attendants to ask Chairman Shao (Shao Li-tzu, chairman of Shensi provincial government) to come to see me. I waited futilely for an hour, but he did not come. Several times I questioned the attendants, and their replies were not satisfactory. I felt very suspicious about their attitude and wondered if he had left the place of his confinement or had been killed by the rebels, which latter thought caused me much anxiety for his safety.

By noon Chang came again and, repeating his former request, urged me to move to another place. He said the guards here were not his men, and he found it very inconvenient to visit me or talk to me.

At the same time he could not bear full responsibility for my safety and comfort while I am here, for which he was very sorry. So, at any rate, I must move to the Kao residence. I told him I was determined not to move.

Chang then said, "We have read your diary and other important documents and from them have learned the greatness of your personality. Your loyalty to the revolutionary cause and your determination to bear the responsibility of saving the country far exceed anything we could have imagined. You have blamed me in your diary for having no character? I now really feel that this may be so. Your great fault is that you have always spoken too little of your mind to your subordinates. If I had known one tenth of what is recorded in your diary I would certainly not have done this rash act. Now I know very clearly that my former views were wrong. Now that I realize your qualities of leadership I feel it would be disloyal to the country if I did not do my best to protect you. At any rate for you to stay here is no solution of the problem. Even though you absolutely refuse to move I must do everything in my power to see that you do. If you are unwilling to walk out yourself I will carry you out on my back."

I still definitely refused his request and told him that unless I was sent back to Nanking I would not leave this house.

Chang said that his idea of moving me to another

place was to make it possible for him secretly to send me back to Nanking.

I told him that I must leave Sian openly and in a dignified manner if I was to leave at all and would never consent to leaving in secrecy. I said I had told him more than once that one's character is more important than one's life.

Then suddenly Chang showed me a wire from Donald, saying that the latter would come here soon. People have often supposed Donald to be an engaged adviser of the government. The fact is that he is a personal friend and a frequent guest at my house. I might also add that although drawn into my circle, he has resolutely refused any honours or the name of an adviser. This time he is coming to Sian to see me at the request of my wife, to see whether I am dead or alive. I told Chang to ask Donald to see me when he arrived.

Chang still urged me to move, but I did not want to speak much with him and merely said that that matter might be discussed after the arrival of Donald. Tears again ran down Chang's face, and he stayed for a long while before he left.

At 4 P.M. I sent for Yang Hu-chen. Only now have I learned that Yang also participated in the coup. I asked him what he would do to cope with the situation. He said they did not at first expect such developments, and when the coup was carried out with such disorder he felt very sorry. At present,

he said, he was ready to obey my orders and do whatever I told him to do. I asked him how it originated and under what circumstances it got under way, and he merely said that it was very simple at the beginning but would not tell me the details.

I told him I never thought that they would be so fooled by others⁸ and make such a mess. I could not shirk, however, my own responsibility in the matter, as I have always trusted my subordinates too much and have taken no precautions against such contingencies, thereby giving the reactionaries a chance to instigate them to create trouble. On this account I said I should apologize to the Central Authorities and the people, while Yang and his confederates should undo what they had done, send me back to Nanking and confess their guilt to the Central Authorities, so that no further untoward events should develop to endanger the country. They should know that they had already spoiled to a large extent the plan for national salvation. Yang said that he would consult the others and then left.

At 5 P.M. Donald came to see me. I was very much moved by his loyal friendship, especially as he is a foreigner and yet was willing to come so far on such a dangerous mission. After having exchanged greetings he gave me my wife's letter in her own handwriting and suggested that he live in the same house with me. I naturally welcomed him. He said

⁸Meaning the Communists.

that the place I was in was very inconvenient and uncomfortable, and, for the sake of my health, I should change to another place.

Chang was also present and seemed to be very sincere in his regrets. He said that if I would only agree to move into another house with Donald everybody concerned would then obey my orders in everything, and he in addition would send me back to Nanking at an early date.

As Donald also urged me to move, I could not refuse. So in the afternoon we moved into the residence of General Kao.

I very carefully thought over Chang's request that I move to another place but could not find any explanation. Could it be that he was afraid that, should I stay long in the New City, in the sphere of influence of Yang, I might get into close touch with the latter, and Chang would not be able to do with me as he liked?

After changing my residence Chang came to see me. I asked him, since I had complied with his request in this matter, whether he and his confederates had decided to send me back. If not, they should soon decide upon this question. Chang suddenly said that the matter was not so simple. Since many people had participated in the matter, he said, everything had to be decided by them jointly. Besides, they had already sent out an open-letter telegram including eight proposals, and I must agree to some

of them so that the coup might not become meaningless. If, said he, no results whatever were achieved the crowd would not agree to sending me back.

The so-called eight proposals were:

1. Reorganize the Nanking government so that members of other parties and cliques might come in and help save the nation.
2. Stop all civil wars.
3. Release immediately the patriotic leaders who had been arrested in Shanghai.
4. Pardon all political offenders.
5. Guarantee the people's liberty of assembly.
6. Give a free hand to the people to carry out patriotic movements.
7. Carry out the leader's will⁹ faithfully.
8. Call a National Salvation Conference immediately.

I strongly rebuked him for going back on his own promise, which he made before my change of residence, and did not allow him to go on with his speech. I also said that whatever proposals they might have and however good the proposals might sound, their conduct in effecting the coup was absolutely wrong, and nobody could believe in their sincerity nor support their proposals.

Chang further explained the reasons for their eight proposals and wanted me to consider them. I said I had determined to sacrifice my life rather

⁹Dr Sun Yat-sen's.

than sign any document while under duress and had thought over the situation very carefully. At the former place of confinement I had already told him about it; why should he still be unable to understand my position? He should know that although he is able to make a captive of my body he could never break my will power. I could not possibly yield on any of these points nor even listen to their proposals until I am back in Nanking. There was no use for them to talk further.

Chang said that I was too despotic and that even as a simple citizen he should have a chance to express his views about the affairs of the nation.

I told him that I am bearing now the responsibility of the life or death of the nation, and all loyal citizens should obey the orders of the Central Authorities as well as those of their leader. If they captured their leader and tried to compel him to do this or that, could they be still considered as citizens?

"Besides," said I, "you are a military officer and cannot enjoy the same privileges as a common citizen. All those who try to endanger the fate of the nation are my enemies as well as the enemies of the people. If you want to assume the rights of a private citizen you should express your opinion in the People's Convention or the local legislative bodies. In the present political and party system of organization you can also present your proposals to the

Central Authorities. Instead you have taken part in a mutiny, feel no remorse about your wrongdoing and try to cover up your own tracks by making these so-called proposals. All this is entirely wrong. In short, before I go back to Nanking there can be no discussion about your terms or proposals."

Then Chang asked if, after my return, their proposals might be brought up before the Central Authorities.

I replied that I would allow them to bring the matter up, but at the same time I must say that I could not agree with their proposals.

"If you do not approve of them," said Chang, "what then would be the use of bringing them up?"

I said the party has its rules and its discipline, and I could not decide alone, but decisions must be made by majority vote.

Chang remained silent for a long while and then said, "You, the generalissimo, certainly have a very high character, but there is one defect, namely, that the generalissimo's thinking is too old and too much inclined to the right."

I asked him what he meant by "old", "too much . . . to the right."

He seemed to be unable to reply, but after a while he said that the books I read are such as the writings of Han Fei and Mo Ti¹⁰ which are certainly too old.

¹⁰Two philosophers of the Warring Nations Period.

"I don't know how many new books you have read," said I, "nor what you consider as new books. If you consider Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* or books on Communism as new books, then you may ask me questions about them, and I will discuss them with you in detail. You should know that one's spirit is not new or old according to the books one reads. What you consider as new books I had already read many times some fifteen years ago."

After a long while Chang mentioned another thing as an example. He said, "You always have in your head such men as Yo Fei, Wen Tien-hsiang and Sze Ko-fa¹¹ and are therefore behind time in your mentality. Why do you insist upon sacrificing yourself for the sake of principles and not think of the possibility of achievements? I think you are the only great man of this age, but why won't you yield a little, comply with our requests and lead us on in this revolution so that we may achieve something instead of your merely sacrificing your life? In our opinion, to sacrifice one's life is certainly not a good plan nor the real object of a revolutionary."

I was surprised at his wrong reasoning and told him that I considered his words very strange. He should know that revolution meant sacrifice and not speculation for benefit. Sacrifice and achievement are one and the same thing. Our leader said

¹¹All three are well-known characters in Chinese history who sacrificed their lives for the nation.

that one should undergo the supreme sacrifice if one could not attain one's aim, which shows that he, too, did not consider the two things as different.

"To tell you the truth," I said, "my sacrifice will be my achievement. On the day that I sacrifice my life for the sake of principle the revolution will be a success. You have not read the leader's lecture on spiritual education, in which he said that the country would live when he died and that it would die if he lived simply for his own sake."

He confessed that he had not read these statements, and while he could easily understand why the country would perish if our leader had tried to save his own life, he could not appreciate the meaning of the nation living when the leader dies.

I sighed and said, "You really have not learned the great principles of revolution; hence you commit such serious blunders. If I should try to save my life today and forget the welfare of the nation and the question of life and death of the race or if I become afraid in the face of danger, my character as a military man will be destroyed, and the nation will be in a precarious position. This means that the nation will perish when I live. On the other hand, if I stand firm and would rather sacrifice my life than compromise my principles I shall be able to maintain my integrity till death, and my spirit will live forever. Then multitudes of others will follow me and bear the duties of office according

to this spirit of sacrifice. Then, though I die, the nation will live. So if anyone wrongly thinks that he can manipulate national affairs by capturing me and endangering my life he is a perfect fool."

Chang saw that he could not compel me to do anything and retired in silence.

After Chang left Donald told me what the Central Authorities had decided upon and done after the coup, and that they were determined upon a punitive expedition against the rebels. I was very glad and became further convinced that the influence of the deeds and teachings of our leader would last long, and no matter what the danger to me might be, I need not worry for the nation.

Donald also told me that my wife insisted upon coming to Sian, whereupon I told him that she must not come.

I asked Donald to tell this to my wife and ask her to come only after my death.

I heard that J. L. Huang¹² had come with Donald and was surprised that he had not come to see me.

December 15. I am very anxious to have J. L. Huang come to see me so that he might carry a letter back for me to my wife. For all I know, that telegram of the other day may never have been dis-

¹²Secretary to the generalissimo and secretary-general of the New Life Movement.

patched. But when I told my intention to Chang, he, unwilling that Huang should become aware of the strict surveillance I am placed under, like a common prisoner, and should report the fact to the Central government when he returns, asked Huang to wait at the aerodrome and told me that I could have my letter delivered by messenger to Huang at the aerodrome. He explained that Huang was waiting at the aerodrome for fear lest bad weather might interfere with flying. I felt so displeased with Chang that I decided not to say anything nor to write that letter.

Later, after having been admonished by Donald, Chang sent Huang in to see me, but before we met I was cautioned not to say anything else except that I was well in order to appease my wife's anxiety. He wanted my remarks to be of the same vein as the telegraphic message they had sent out. I made no replies, and when Huang came I wrote the following note to my wife:

As I have made up my mind to sacrifice my life, if necessary, for my country, please do not worry about me. I will never allow myself to do anything to make my wife ashamed of me or become unworthy of being a follower of Dr Sun Yat-sen. Since I was born for the revolution I will gladly die for the same cause. I will return my body unspotted to my parents. As to home affairs, I have nothing to say further than that I wish you would, to glad-

den my spirit, regard my two sons, Ching-kuo and Wei-kuo, as your own children. However, you must never come to Shensi.

After writing the letter I read it aloud several times for Huang's benefit, so that even if it should be intercepted Huang could verbally carry the message to my wife.

I later learned that Chang not only intercepted the letter, but also did not allow Huang to return to the capital. This is because Chang wanted my wife to come to Shensi, hoping that she might persuade me to comply with his demands, but in my letter I distinctly told her not to come. On the other hand, as Chang dared not let my wife wait too long for news, he requested Donald to go to Loyang to give her information regarding me over the long-distance telephone. The one and only hope of the Sian leaders was that through my wife's efforts the Central forces might be dissuaded from attacking Sian.

Pao Wen-yueh¹⁸ came in the afternoon to report that Donald and another person had flown to Loyang. I naturally inferred that the other person was J. L. Huang, but afterwards I found out that Pao's visit was prearranged by Chang just to lead me into thinking that Huang was returning to Nanking.

¹⁸Former chief of staff to Chang Hsueh-liang and latterly a member of the Military Affairs Commission at Nanking.

Chang again came to see me in the night, with news telegrams in his hands, from which he reported to me the news of the day. When he came to the item about the Kwantung Army pushing forward to Suiyuan his face wore a rather penitent look, and he seemed very anxious to bring the Sian affair to a speedy close. I did not understand his state of mind. He also confessed that Yang Hu-chen had long wanted to rebel, and that although he himself had been repeatedly instigated to participate he hesitated to do so until the 10th instant when, under the influence of anger because of the reprimand he received from me at Lintung, he decided to join forces with Yang, but that he had repented since. Should China perish as a direct result of the coup he said he would have only one of two roads to choose: (1) to commit suicide, or (2) to go into the hills and become a bandit.

I remember the 10th instant. This was the day on which Chang came to tell me how he explained to the body of petitioners (students' demonstration) that he could be their representative as well as mine. Upon hearing this, I severely upbraided him for his acceptance at Sian of the doctrine of the "People's Front", his enlistment of reactionary politicians and his laissez-faire attitude towards the activities of the so-called National Salvation Association. The aim of this association in exciting students and soldiers to rebellion cannot but tend to disrupt the

social structure of the Northwest and cause unrest among the people. This state of affairs gave me a great deal of anxiety.

However, ever since 1928, when Chang, of his own volition, took orders from the Central government and thus helped to bring the nation into unification, I have always regarded him as a patriotic and promising soldier, and I always stood up for him when he was slandered, no matter by whom or how. At the time when he was given supreme military authority in the Northwest, which is strategically an area of great importance, I earnestly exhorted him to be steadfast in his purpose and faithful to his duties so as to prepare the way for wiping out his own disgrace and saving the nation. I fully hoped then that he would render loyal and meritorious service to our country, but his behaviour now is completely contrary to my expectations. What he has done places the vast territory of the Northwest in great danger of suffering the same fate as that of the Northeast. I deplore my misjudgment of character and the consequent misplacement of my confidence, because of which I feel apologetic not only to the party and the nation, but also to my countrymen of the Northwest. I felt so grieved and vexed that I had the incident of the 10th recorded in my diary with these remarks: "It is a pity that Hanching, although smart in trifling matters, is apt to blunder in important affairs and, with an unsteady

mind, is weak in determination." Chang must have read the whole thing by now.

December 16. In the early morning Chang, gray of face and nervous, came to see me. He informed me that he had last night succeeded in persuading the committee to agree to sending me back to Nanking within four to seven days, but as the Central troops had suddenly started bombing at Weinan and Hwahsien, it had so exasperated the popular feeling that my release could not be effected as planned. What could he do? he asked.

The news bears out the strong determination of the Central government to suppress the rebellion, and, like a traveller who has just received good tidings from his home, I was very glad.

Why did Chang put the period from four to seven days? Could they be waiting for certain developments?

From Donald, who had just returned from Loyang in the early afternoon, I learned that Central troops were on the move between Loyang and Sian. I felt relieved, for the safety or danger of one individual's life is not worth considering when the future of the party, the nation and the people is assured.

This evening, at Chang's request, Mr Chiang Pai-li¹⁴ called on me. Mr Chiang arrived at Sian

¹⁴A retired veteran military officer, one-time president of Paoting Military Academy.

just before the trouble started and is being detained at the Sian Reception House. He said that conditions were changing for the better, but should the Central troops assume the offensive too hastily an ugly turn of affairs might result. Even if I were willing to sacrifice myself I should, according to him, pity the people of the Northwest who had already suffered much at the hands of the Communists, and I must give in at certain points for the preservation of the nation. He urged me over and over again to write to the Central Military Authorities that I would soon be out of Shensi and that the punitive expedition should be instructed not to attack and bombing must first be stopped.

I replied, "This is not so easy to do. If, however, a definite date for escorting me back to Nanking in the very near future could be given I would of my own free will send written instructions to the Central Military Authorities to suspend bombing for three days, and in the circumstances they might believe the instructions to be genuine. The request for cessation of hostilities must not come from Chang, whose demand for seven days grace is clearly nothing but a trick to temporize for time. Not only will the Central Authorities have no faith in it, but I myself also cannot possibly be fooled by it."

Mr Chiang remarked on leaving that further dis-



Acme—P. & A. Photo

In October 1936. In the front row, *left to right*: General Chang Hsueh-liang; Mme Chiang Kai-shek; General Chiang Kai-shek; and General Yen Shi-shan.

cussion would be necessary, and a person must be chosen to be the messenger.

Soon after Mr Chiang was gone Chang came in again. He imparted the news that fighting between the Central government troops and Yang Hu-chen's men had actually broken out at Hwahsien, and if the former should push further on, his soldiers would have no alternative but to retreat. His hidden threat of bringing me with them to some other locality in the word "retreat" was not lost upon me, but I ignored it entirely.

December 17. Before noon today Mr Chiang Pai-li came again at Chang's request, asking me to write to the Central Military Authorities according to what I had said yesterday, ordering a postponement of the general assault for three days, and Chiang Ming-san (General Chiang Ting-wen)¹⁵ was to carry the letter by airplane to Loyang.

I promised to accede to the request, and when Ming-san came I wrote a letter in my own handwriting to Chin-chih (General Ho Ying-chin), asking him to defer the bombing for three days till Saturday, and I handed it to Ming-san.

In the afternoon Chang came and said, "There are too many complications, but anyway we will have Ming-san deliver the note first and discuss

¹⁵One of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's chief generals.

other matters later. Ming-san, by the way, is already on his way to Loyang."

I guess the attack must be rather severe, and Chang's remark about discussing other matters later is a preconceived excuse for putting off my release. Sincerity and righteousness have no place in the conduct of rebels, so I can only let them do as they like.

December 18. A week has elapsed since the revolt, but as I have decided to disregard my personal safety, my heart is at peace. I read the writings of the philosopher Mo Ti to while away the time.

This evening Chang told me that he was in receipt of a telegraphic communication from Nanking, stating that T. V. (T. V. Soong)¹⁶ and Mo-san (General Ku Chu-tung)¹⁷ both would soon come to Sian. I had already heard of T. V.'s coming when Donald telephoned to Nanking from Loyang, and I surmised Chang must have sent them an invitation in the first place. Chang also said that in a telegram Mo-san had expressed his willingness to bear the responsibility of talking over the situation with Chang or Yang if either of them would meet him in person at a designated place.

¹⁶Former minister of finance, brother of Mme Chiang Kai-shek, and now chairman of the board of directors of the Bank of China and concurrently a member of the standing committee of the National Economic Council.

¹⁷Chairman of Kweichow Province.

Chang said he had telegraphed back to the effect that I was most anxious to have Mo-san come. This, however, sets my mind at ease, for I know from Mo-san's telegram that he would not be deceived by Chang and Yang and fall into their trap. If he should also come to Sian, then many of the Central military leaders of high rank would be caught in a net in this city of peril. No word has been received of Ting-wen after his arrival at the capital, and Chang appears quite worried. As to myself, I feel assured of the Central Authorities' determination and pray for the early arrival of the Central punitive force at Sian.

December 19. For the past few days I have been suffering from pains in the joints, but today my side aches and is so acute that I can hardly sit up. I have, however, finished reading Mo Ti.

Today is Saturday, marking the end of the three-day truce, but Chang and his confederates have shown no intention of escorting me back to Nanking. Being fully aware of the worthlessness of their promises, I have not allowed myself to entertain the least hope in this respect.

Chang dropped in during the evening. He told me that the date for the departure of T. V. and Mo-san from Nanking was not yet definite, but he had heard from Ming-san, reporting satisfactory results of his mission to Nanking. I probed the

meaning of these words and assured myself that the outcome could not be what Chang imagined it to be. Chang showed his eagerness to close the unhappy incident and requested me to consider the acceptance of some of the demands that could be more easily put into practice. He explained that it would suffice if I would accept only four of the eight demands. Upon being asked which four were struck off the list, he said the last four. I told him that since I had not yet returned to Nanking, and even if they could convince me, not a single demand could be put into operation, and hence no discussion could be entered into, no matter whether demands numbered eight or four.

December 20. In the forenoon when I heard the buzzing of airplanes overhead I naturally thought that, the three days having expired, fighting must have been resumed at the front and the airplane I heard was probably reconnoitring.

But soon afterwards T. V., accompanied by Chang and Donald, entered my room. I realized then that the noise I heard came from his plane and was much surprised. I shook hands with him with mingled joy and sorrow. I could hardly say a word. T. V. handed me a note from my wife. In it my wife wrote: "Should T. V. fail to return to Nanking within three days I will come to Shensi to live and die with you." My eyes got wet.

T. V. then hinted to Chang and Donald to go out, and he himself stayed with me in the room. This was the first time since my detention that I had been allowed to talk with another without the presence of a third person, but I knew there were eavesdroppers outside the door. It was only then that I learned J. L. Huang had not gone back to Nanking.

I had previously made out my will; now I gave it to T. V. to be shown to my wife. We asked about each other's personal affairs. I was deeply grieved when T. V. broke the news of Chao Yuan-chung's death at the Sian Reception House during the fracas.

I told T. V. of the seizure of my diary and important documents by Chang and his change of attitude after their perusal. I stressed the point that unless punitive operations were speedily carried out there was no other way of delivering the country from the present crisis. I also showed him my plans of attack so that he might relate them to the Central Authorities. After a half-hour's conversation I pressed him to leave, for if the conversation were prolonged it would raise suspicions.

Towards nightfall T. V. came to see me again. I said to him, "Whatever you do, you must first think of the preservation of the nation. Do not take my personal safety into consideration. We must put the welfare of the public first and our personal interests

last. Even if Sian be surrounded by troops and I myself be in personal danger, my heart will be serene."

Tonight Chang asked me to avail myself of the presence of T. V. to discuss with him one or two questions with a view to settlement. I gravely declined to do so and gave him to understand that nothing would be discussed prior to my return to Nanking.

December 21. In the morning I slept so soundly that I did not wake up until 11 A.M. T. V. Soong came into the room to see me, but I was not quite awake, and I could not at first make out who he was. After a while I realized that it was T. V. He told me that he was preparing to return to Nanking today. I was surprised at his early departure, as he had told me the night before that he meant to stay here three days.

Just as I was going to say something T. V. came close and told me that somebody was eavesdropping outside the door, and it was not convenient to talk. However, the military plans formulated in Nanking, he said, were exactly the same as those I had in mind. So I said, "If the plans are the same as mine, then in five days the army of the government should be able to surround Sian. I might then be safe; and even if not, I should not be afraid. Please tell our comrades in Nanking to go ahead for the

sake of the country and not to be deterred by any consideration of my personal safety."

T. V. nodded twice, told me not to say any more and shook hands with me on parting. I told him in a loud voice not to come again and also to urge my wife not to come to Sian in any circumstances. At the same time I made signs with my hand to show him that the Central government must order the troops to proceed quickly to attack the city.

T. V. said that he would come back again day after tomorrow, but I gesticulated to him not to come.

"No harm will come to me if I return," T. V. remarked, "because they have no bad feelings against me."

After having left the room he came back again and told me that he would certainly come back again to see me day after tomorrow. I knew T. V. was feeling sad about parting from me, as it might mean farewell forever. On my part, having already determined to sacrifice my life, I had mingled feelings at parting from T. V. and asking him to take care of my wife and children.

When Chang came to see me today I asked him where he was keeping my letter to my wife, which I had asked him to send through J. L. Huang—which he had not done as I requested.

He said, "If the generalissimo should someday return to the capital in safety the letter would be

personally delivered to Madame Chiang; if, on the other hand, you should die here, the letter would also be personally delivered."

Apparently he was trying to threaten me. In the evening he came again and said that he had to leave Sian for a day or two. When asked where he was going he said that fighting had started, many soldiers had been killed, and he was asked by the rebels to go to the front and direct the operations. He would be back in a day or two.

From the way he said these things it seemed that he was trying to find out if I were afraid. As I showed no signs of fear or agitation, he left me without any further word.

December 22. All day today I hoped to hear the noise of airplanes and guns, as from the agitated appearance of Chang, when he came to see me last night, the troops of the rebels must have been badly defeated, and those of the Central government must be pushing forward very quickly. All day there was no sound of planes. My wife arrived at 4 P.M.

I was so surprised to see her that I felt as if I were in a dream. I had told T. V. more than once the day before that my wife must not come to Sian, and when she braved all danger to come to the lion's den I was very much moved and almost wanted to cry.

My wife tried her best to be cheerful when she

saw me, but I was very much worried about her safety. For about ten days I have already put away all thoughts about my own safety, but from now on I shall have to worry about her. She is so courageous, wise, kind and affectionate that I have always been confident that her contribution to the party and the country will have far-reaching results. She and I have always been of the same mind, and we have unceasingly exhorted each other to fight to the end for the principles of our leader, Dr Sun, with the hope that they will be finally carried out. How, then, can I bear the thought of having her life sacrificed in this dangerous city?

When I read the Old Testament this morning I happened to come across the saying that "Jehovah will now do a new thing, and that is, He will make a woman protect a man."¹⁸ When my wife arrived in the afternoon it seemed that the word of God was to be carried out. If my wife had not very strong faith in God, how could she brave such dangers to come to me?

She told me what happened outside and said that Chiang Ting-wen, Tai Li, Donald and T. V. had come with her and persuaded me, above everything else, to find some way to leave this place.

To this I replied, "Since you are patriotic and know what is right and wrong, you should know that we must place the welfare of the country first.

¹⁸Jeremiah xxxi:22—According to the Chinese version.

When you come here today to share my plight you are doing this for the country rather than for me.

"If other people urge you to persuade me to do anything which is not right you must refuse in unmistakable terms. While here, I cannot by any means put my signature to or promise anything which the rebels may ask me to do. Once I promise that, I would be doing something unlawful, as well as against the revolutionary principles of the party, and it would amount to betraying the trust which the people have placed in me. In that case I would have even less chance of leaving here, and if I should leave and survive this danger it would be little better than to die."

My wife consoled me and asked me not to worry. She said that she had long known my principles and my ideas.

"I have also put the country before you, and your character before your life," she said, "and I will certainly not force you to do anything against your wishes. However, as I have come to share the danger with you so that we may live or die together, you should derive some consolation from that."

She also told me that, among the bodyguards and civil officers of my retinue, Chiang Hsiao-hsien, Hsiao Nai-hwa, Mao Yu-li, Chiang Jui-chang, Tang Ken-liang, Chang Hwa, Hung Chia-yung and many others died at Hwachingchih (Lintung) when the rebels attacked my headquarters there.

Two others—Chu Pei-chi and Shih Wen-piao—received very severe wounds, while the fate of many others was not yet known. When I think of the sacrifice these men have made I feel very sad, but at the same time I am glad that they have carried out my teachings to be so loyal to the country. Among these, Hsiao Nai-hwa was not a military officer, and it is therefore more to be lamented that he, too, should have given up his life in fighting the rebels.

December 23. I discussed the situation and its possible consequences with my wife. We both feel that the psychology of the rebel leaders in Sian has undergone some change, and they are not quite so insistent as before. However, I believe that one must stand by one's convictions in order to deal with constantly changing circumstances in this world. Only then can one not be ashamed before heaven and earth and remain consistent whether in danger or in safety. This is the only way to overcome difficulties.

My wife asked me to tell her how our leader (Dr Sun Yat-sen) met similar danger in Canton. When I told her she replied that my having gone a long hazardous journey to join our leader on the cruiser Yung Feng brought him company and consolation in his plight. She asked who would now do the same for me as I did for our leader.

In reply I told her that the circumstances in these two cases were quite different. "This time, if anyone comes here to see me, he loses his liberty and can be of no help to me. I know that many of my comrades and students are very anxious to come, but they find it impossible to do so.

"Although I have no friend or student to come and share my peril, you, my wife, disregarding all dangers, came here. To have a husband and wife who are willing to share all hazards of fortune together is more precious even than having a student who would share the danger of his teacher."¹⁹

Today T. V. conferred with Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-chen for half a day, but nothing has yet been agreed upon concerning my return to Nanking.

During the night T. V. came and told me there should be no great difficulty in getting me away without agreeing to any of their terms. He said he would do all in his power to accomplish this result.

December 24. The leaders in Sian suddenly disagreed over what they had discussed with T. V. yesterday. They indicated that they could not let me go until the Central government troops had withdrawn to Tungkwan.

T. V. is very much upset, but I am taking it quite calmly, as I have not been expecting to leave this

¹⁹This is said because the generalissimo is a student of Dr Sun.

dangerous place. The question of life and death bothers me no more.

Later the radical elements of what they call the Northwest Committee brought up seven terms and asked T. V. to present them to me.

T. V. flatly refused, saying that these terms could never be shown to Mr Chiang.²⁰

Chang Hsueh-liang then came out as a mediator and told them that no more "politics" should be played; otherwise he would do as he saw fit. The terms were then withdrawn.

There were many changes during the day, and in the evening it was said that Yang Hu-chen was firmly against sending me back to Nanking, and he and Chang almost quarrelled. However, I am not in a position to know whether or not, on their part, all this was sincere.

December 25. In the morning T. V. came and told me that Chang had decided to send me back to Nanking, but on account of Yang's opposition I could not openly go out of the city, as the city gates and the airfield were guarded by Yang's troops, who were also stationed in large numbers both inside and outside the city.

Chang wanted to send my wife and Donald to the airfield, telling the others that my wife would first go to Nanking to mediate and I would still stay

²⁰In the party the generalissimo is always called Mr Chiang.

in Sian, while at the same time I was to go in disguise into the barracks of Chang's soldiers whence he would send me to the airfield.

Later Chang himself also told the same plan to my wife, urging her to leave quickly lest she should be endangered by the fight that would ensue between his troops and those of Yang. Chang said he would feel even greater remorse if that should happen.

My wife replied that she would not have come to Sian if she were afraid of danger. Since she had already come she would not leave unless I were to leave with her. She was prepared to live or die with me, and she was also sure that I would not try to escape from danger in disguise.

Chang was very much impressed by what she said and promised to find some way to send us both back.

By noon T. V. came and told me that Yang had slightly changed his mind.

At 2 P.M. T. V. asked me to prepare for departure, which he said would most likely take place today.

Chang also came later, saying that Yang had fully agreed to send me back, the plane was ready, and I might go to the airfield right away.

I told him to bring Yang to see me, which he did within half an hour. I told them to sit in front of my bed and gave them a long and sincere talk (the details of which are given in succeeding pages).

After the talk I asked them what they thought about it and if they had anything further to say.

Neither of them had anything to say and left. I then got out of bed, dressed and arrived at the airfield at 4 P.M.

At the time of departure Chang insisted upon accompanying me to Nanking. I told him several times to stay, as there would be no one to command the Northeast Army when he left. Besides, it might not be convenient for him to go to Nanking at present.

He said that he had asked Yang to look after his troops as well as instructed his subordinates to obey Yang's orders. So we left by plane and arrived at Loyang at 5:20 P.M. In the evening we stayed at the Branch Academy of the Military Cadets.

December 26. The plane started at nine-forty-five from Loyang and arrived at Nanking at 12:20 P.M. When I saw President Lin and my comrades of the Central government waiting for me at the airfield I bowed to the president and greeted all the others. I felt very much ashamed when I saw, on going into the city in my car, that the people gave me such hearty welcome on the streets. I recollected that, during the half month, although I had not degraded my personality as a revolutionary leader, nor had I violated any of our leader's teachings while I was in dangerous surroundings, the party

and the country had both been endangered, and much unnecessary sacrifice had been borne by others.

The coup d'état was due to my inability to teach and discipline my subordinates as well as to prepare for such unexpected contingencies. I feel such deep remorse on this account that I cannot well express it in writing.

Fortunately the Central government handled the situation well, and my comrades in the party, the government and the army, as well as all people of the country, co-operated in maintaining the authority of the government. They were also very anxious about my personal safety. As a result the trouble subsided, the country returned to stability, and a coup d'état which had shocked the whole world passed without causing any great disturbance.

As I had prepared to die for the country, I am conscious of living a second life as I arrive again in Nanking. As long as I live I shall always remember with gratitude the concern which President Lin, my comrades in the Central government and party organizations, as well as my fellow countrymen have shown. Hereafter I must exert myself more strenuously than ever and be doubly loyal to the nation in order to repay their kindness.

THE GENERALISSIMO'S ADMONITION
TO CHANG HSUEH-LIANG AND YANG
HU-CHEN PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE
FROM SIAN

"THIS COUP D'ÉTAT is an act which gravely affects both the continuity of Chinese history of five thousand years and the life and death of the Chinese nation, and it is a criterion whereby the character of the Chinese race may be judged. Since today you have shown due regard for the welfare of the nation and have decided to send me back to Nanking and no longer try to make any special demands or force me to make any promise or give any orders, it marks a turning point in the life of the nation and is also an indication of the high moral and cultural standard of the Chinese people.

"It is an ancient Chinese saying that a gentleman should correct his mistakes as soon as he realizes them. The present outcome of the coup d'état shows that you are both ready to correct your own mistakes, and that is creditable to you as well as augur-

ing a bright future for the Chinese race. Since you are now so convinced by my sincerity towards you that you have the courage to acknowledge your wrongdoing you are entitled to remain as my subordinates. Furthermore, since you can be so readily converted it will certainly be easier for your subordinates to follow suit.

“Formerly you were deceived by reactionaries and believed that I did not treat the people fairly and squarely and that I was not loyal to our revolutionary ideals. But now you have read my private diary for this whole year, the public and private telegrams and documents numbering some fifty thousand words that have passed through my hands during the past two months as well as my plans for the salvation of the nation and those relating to internal administration, foreign affairs, military finance and education, numbering some one hundred thousand words, you must now know that there is not a single word which could condemn me of any self-interest or insincerity on my part.

“In fact since I took military command and began to take charge of military training there are two principles which I have always emphasized to my students and subordinates, namely:

“(1) That if I have any selfish motives or do anything against the welfare of the country and the people, then anybody may consider me a traitor and may shoot me on that account.

“(2) If my words and deeds are in the least insincere and I neglect the principles and revolutionary ideals, my soldiers may treat me as their enemy and may also shoot me.

“From my diary and the other documents you can see whether you can find one word which is to the detriment of the revolution. If you can find one such word here I am still in Sian and you are at liberty to condemn and kill me. On my part I am glad that I have always done what I have taught other people to do, namely, to be sincere and disinterested, and I can say in all confidence that I have done nothing of which I need be ashamed.

“The responsibility of this coup d'état naturally rests with you two, but I consider myself also responsible for the causes which led up to the crisis. I have always worked for the country and always believed that my sincerity and teaching would reach all my subordinates. Hence I have not paid any attention to my personal safety. I have taken no precautions on that account and have therefore tempted the reactionaries to take advantage of the situation. Everything has its remote causes. My own carelessness was the remote cause of this coup d'état and gave rise to this breakdown of discipline, causing the Central government as well as the people much worry and the nation much loss. On this account I feel I am to be blamed and must apologize to the nation, the party and the people.

"A country must have law and discipline. You two are military officers in command of troops, and when such a coup d'état has taken place you should submit to the judgment of the Central government. However, I recognize that you were deceived by propaganda of reactionaries and misjudged my good intentions to be bad ones. Fortunately immediately after the coup you realized that it was harmful to the country and expressed your deep remorse to me. Now you have further realized your own mistake in listening to reactionaries and are now convinced that not only have I had no bad intentions towards you, but that I have always had every consideration for you.

"I have always told my subordinates that when they make mistakes their superiors must also be blamed for not having given them adequate training. As I am in supreme command of the army, your fault is also my fault, and I must ask for punishment by the Central Authorities. At the same time I will explain to them that you sincerely regret what you have done. As you have rectified your mistake at an early stage, the crisis has not been prolonged, and I believe the Central Authorities should be able to be lenient with you.

"Meanwhile you should tell your subordinates how you have been deceived by reactionaries and how I have always had only the welfare of the nation at heart, so that they will not be unduly disturbed

over whatever decisions the Central government may make.

"I have always impressed upon the people the importance of ethical principles and integrity to cultivate a sense of probity and of shame, to bear responsibility and to obey discipline. If a superior officer cannot make his subordinates observe these principles he himself is partly to be blamed. Hence in connection with this crisis I am ready to bear the responsibility as your superior officer. On your part you should be ready to abide by whatever decision the Central government may make, and your subordinates need not have any fear for themselves.

"We must always remember that the life of the nation is more important than anything else. We should not care for ourselves although our personal integrity must be preserved in order that the nation may exist on a firm foundation. Our lives may be sacrificed, but the law and discipline of the nation must be upheld. Our bodies may be confined, but our spirit must be free. My own responsibility to the country and the Central government will always be willingly borne as long as I live. That is why I have repeatedly refused to give any orders or sign anything you wanted me to give or sign while under duress. It is because I consider life or death a small matter compared with the upholding of moral principles.

"My words and deeds are not only to be left to

posterity, but I want you to understand them so that you will also value moral principles more than anything else. I have said more than once that if I should make any promise to you or sign anything at your request while at Sian it would amount to the destruction of the nation. If I should try to avoid danger and submit to any duress exercised by my subordinates my own integrity would be destroyed and with it the integrity of the nation, which I represent. No matter whether it be an individual or a nation, the loss of integrity is tantamount to death itself. For the upholding of those moral principles which I have repeatedly emphasized to the people, I am ready to undergo any sacrifice. If I do not carry out my own teachings my subordinates as well as the people of the country will not know what to follow, and the nation will be as good as destroyed.

“From this coup you should learn a definite lesson: that integrity is more important than anything else and that national interests should precede personal ones. If you commit mistakes do not hesitate to admit them and make corrections. You should bear responsibility for what you have done and should make these things plain to your subordinates.

“Dr Sun Yat-sen used to instruct us that we must rebuild the moral fibre of the nation before we could effect a national revival. Honesty, righteousness and love of peace are important moral characteristics of our country. For more than ten years I have

devoted myself to uniting the nation, politically and spiritually, for national salvation and honesty and righteousness are of particular importance. I have always tried to carry out my own words. Anything that is beneficial to the country and the people I will do with total disregard of my personal interests. Recommendations of this nature have always been accepted and put into practice.

“The policy of the Central government for the last few years has been to achieve peace in and unification of the country and to increase the strength of the nation. Nothing should be done to impair this strength. During the present crisis, as you engineered the coup, you are responsible for bringing about warfare in the country. But as you have expressed remorse, I shall recommend the Central government to settle the matter in a way that will not be prejudicial to the interests of the nation.

“In short you now know the situation of our country as well as my determination to save it. I always give first thought to the life and death of the nation as well as the success or failure of the revolution and do not pay any attention to personal favours or grudges. Questions of personal danger or loss are of no interest to me. I have had the benefit of receiving personal instruction from Dr Sun concerning broad-mindedness, benevolence and sincerity, and am not vindictive with regard to things that have passed. As you felt remorse very early, it

shows that you know that the welfare of the nation is above everything else. That being the case, you ought to obey unreservedly the orders of the Central government and carry out whatever decisions it may make. This is the way to save the nation from the dangers it is facing, and this is the way to turn a national calamity into a national blessing."

NAMES OF CHINESE PERSONS AND PLACES MENTIONED IN THE STORY AND DIARY

CHANG HSUEH-LIANG (General)—Vice-commander-in-chief of the Northwestern Bandit Suppression Forces.

CHANG PAI-LI (General)—Retired veteran military officer. Former president of Paoting Military Academy.

CHIANG TING-WEN (General)—One of Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted generals, who was arrested at Sian during the mutiny. A few days previously he had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Northwestern Bandit Suppression Forces.

FENG CHIN-TSAI—Commander of the 42nd Division during the Sian trouble.

KAO KWEI-TZE—Commander of the 84th Division, a native of Shensi Province.

KU CHU-TUNG (General)—Chairman of Kweichow Province, director of the generalissimo's headquarters in Szechwan; now director of the generalissimo's headquarters in Shensi.

LI TIEN-TSAI—Assistant director of the Northwestern Political Training Department of the Military Affairs Commission, under Chang Hsueh-liang.

SHAO LI-TZU—Chairman of Shensi Province.

SOONG, T. V.—Brother of Mme Chiang Kai-shek; former minister of finance and now chairman of the board of directors of the Bank of China and concurrently a member of the standing committee of the National Economic Council.

SUN MING-CHIU—Commander of the 2nd Battalion of Chang Hsueh-liang's bodyguard. After the Sian affair he was promoted to be commander of the Special Corps Regiment.

SUN WEI-JU—Commander of the 17th Division during the Sian trouble. Now chairman of Shensi Province.

SUNG WEN-MEI—Commander of the Special Service Battalion of the pacification commissioner's headquarters.

TAN HAI—Assistant commander of the 105th Division and concurrently chief aide de camp to Chang Hsueh-liang and directing the bodyguards who were with Chang Hsueh-liang.

TANG CHUN-YAO—Commander of the 2nd Brigade of the Division, under Chang Hsueh-liang.

YANG HU-CHEN (General)—Pacification commissioner of Shensi Province.

YU HSUEH-CHUNG (General)—Commander of the 51st Army and concurrently chairman of Kansu Province, under Chang Hsueh-liang.

HAN-CHING—Courtesy name of General Chang Hsueh-liang.

MING-SAN—Courtesy name of General Chiang Ting-wen.

MO-SAN—Courtesy name of General Ku Chu-tung.

NOTE:—Most Chinese are given two names; the courtesy name is used only with, and by, intimate friends.

THE NORTHEASTERN ARMY—The army of Chang Hsueh-liang, formerly stationed in the Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria), which was transferred to North China about a year before the Mukden Incident.

LINTUNG—A district of Shensi Province, 15 miles from Sian, capital of Shensi Province, where is located a thermal spring, called Hwachingchih, which has historical significance. About A.D. 740 Yang Kwei-fei lived there when Sian was the capital of China. She was a consort of an emperor of the Tang dynasty and was credited with being the most beautiful woman during the period. She is said to have spent most of her time at this hot spring.

SCH. R.

Date Due

RESERVED

JUL 31 1940

OCT 1 - 1940

SCH. R.

RESERVED

FEB 27 '43 '43

JUN 2 4

RESERVED

RESERVED

~~3 DAY RESERVE~~

Div. S. 951 C532G

329260

D02630585T



Duke University Libraries